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Abstract	
Modern	western	economies	(in	the	Eurozone	and	elsewhere)	face	a	number	of	challenges	over	the	
coming	decades.		Achieving	full	employment,	meeting	climate	change	and	other	key	environmental	
targets,	and	reducing	inequality	rank	amongst	the	highest	of	these.		The	conventional	route	to	
achieving	these	goals	has	been	to	pursue	economic	growth.	But	this	route	has	created	two	critical	
problems	for	modern	economies.	The	first	is	that	higher	growth	leads	(ceteris	parabis)	to	higher	
environmental	impact.	The	second	is	that	fragility	in	financial	balances	has	accompanied	relentless	
demand	expansion.		
The	prevailing	global	response	to	the	first	problem	has	been	to	encourage	a	decoupling	of	output	
from	impacts	by	investing	in	green	technologies	(green	growth).	But	this	response	runs	the	risk	of	
exacerbating	problems	associated	with	the	over-leveraging	of	households,	firms	and	governments	
and	places	undue	confidence	in	unproven	and	imagined	technologies.	An	alternative	approach	is	to	
reduce	the	pace	of	growth	and	to	restructure	economies	around	green	services	(post-growth).	But	
the	potential	dangers	of	declining	growth	rates	lie	in	increased	inequality	and	in	rising	
unemployment.	Some	more	fundamental	arguments	have	also	been	made	against	the	feasibility	of	
interest-bearing	debt	within	a	post-growth	economy.			
The	work	described	in	this	paper	was	motivated	by	the	need	to	address	these	fundamental	
dilemmas	and	to	inform	the	debate	that	has	emerged	in	recent	years	about	the	relative	merits	of	
green	growth	and	post-growth	scenarios.	In	pursuit	of	this	aim	we	have	developed	a	suite	of	
macroeconomic	models	based	on	the	methodology	of	Post-Keynesian	Stock	Flow	Consistent	(SFC)	
system	dynamics.		Taken	together	these	models	represent	the	first	steps	in	constructing	a	new	
macroeconomic	synthesis	capable	of	exploring	the	economic	and	financial	dimensions	of	an	
economy	confronting	resource	or	environmental	constraints.	Such	an	ecological	macroeconomics	
includes	an	account	of	basic	macroeconomic	variables	such	as	the	GDP,	consumption,	investment,	
saving,	public	spending,	employment,	and	productivity.	It	also	accounts	for	the	performance	of	the	
economy	in	terms	of	financial	balances,	net	lending	positions,	money	supply,	distributional	equity	
and	financial	stability.		
This	report	illustrates	the	utility	of	this	new	approach	through	a	number	of	specific	analyses	and	
scenario	explorations.	These	include	an	assessment	of	the	Piketty	hypothesis	(that	slow	growth	
increases	inequality),	an	analysis	of	the	‘growth	imperative’	hypothesis	(that	interest	bearing	debt	
requires	economic	growth	for	stability),	and	an	analysis	of	the	financial	and	monetary	implications	of	
green	investment	policies.	The	work	also	assesses	the	scope	for	fiscal	policy	to	improve	social	and	
environmental	outcomes.					
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1 Introduction		
The	WWWforEurope	project		is	a	large-scale	collaborative	project	with	a	common	interest	in	the	
socio-economic	transition	to	sustainability.	The	overall	objective	of	Work	Package	205	is	to	develop	
models	to	support	a	quantitative	understanding	of	the	socio-economic	transition	towards	
sustainability.		
Milestone	38	(Jackson	et	al	2014)	outlined	the	development	of	two	separate	strands	of	modelling	
work,	one	using	a	Dynamic	Stochastic	General	Equilibrium	(DSGE)	approach	and	the	other	using	a	
Stock-Flow	Consistent	(SFC)	system	dynamics	approach.	Milestone	39	(Kratena	et	al	2015)	reports	on	
the	findings	from	the	first	approach.	The	aim	of	Milestone	40	is	to	report	on	the	outcomes	from	the	
SFC	modelling	strand.					
Section	2	of	the	report	elaborates	on	the	motivation	for	the	modelling	approach.	It	sets	out	the	
challenges	associated	with	modelling	the	transition	to	sustainability	and	articulates	the	need	for	an	
‘ecological	macroeconomics’.			
Section	3	describes	the	broad	principles	of	SFC	modelling,	drawing	on	the	pioneering	work	of	Wynne	
Godley	and	his	collaborators.	Though	increasingly	employed	within	the	Post-Keynesian	economic	
paradigm,	SFC	modelling	is	not	particularly	well-known	beyond	that	field	and	has	only	recently	
begun	to	be	used	to	model	social	or	ecological	aspects	of	the	economy.		This	milestone	aims	to	
demonstrate	the	value	of	the	approach	in	understanding	the	transition	to	a	sustainable	economy.		
Sections	4	to	7	describe	four	distinct	modelling	exercises	undertaken	by	the	authors	of	this	report	
using	an	SFC	framework.	The	first	of	these	explores	the	so-called	‘Piketty	hypothesis’	that	declining	
growth	rates	lead	to	rising	inequality.		The	second	examines	the	question	whether	or	not	the	
existence	of	interest-bearing	debt	necessarily	creates	a	‘growth	imperative’.		The	third	model	
explores	the	financial	and	monetary	implications	of	a	large-scale	green	investment	programme.	The	
fourth	model	develops	the	combined	challenge	of	substituting	for	fossil	fuels	in	the	context	of	social	
and	economic	goals.			
Section	8	summarises	the	findings	from	the	overall	work	programme	and	discusses	the	implications	
for	debates	about	green	growth	and	post-growth	economies.		
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2 Motivating	a	Stock-Flow	Consistent	Ecological	Macroeconomics	
One	of	the	clearest	lessons	from	the	financial	crisis	is	that	a	narrow	focus	on	real	economy	indicators	
and	policies	was	insufficient	to	avert	the	potentially	disastrous	consequences	triggered	by	
weaknesses	in	the	US	housing	market,	the	proliferation	of	financial	derivatives,	and	the	subsequent	
collapse	of	Lehman	brothers	in	September	2008.		The	fragility	instilled	within	the	financial	system	as	
a	result	of	over-heated	asset	markets,	over-leveraged	balance	sheets,	and	over-complex	financial	
instruments	went	largely	unnoticed	in	a	policy	environment	focused	primarily	on	aggregate	
indicators	such	as	the	GDP,	employment	rates,	inflation	and	consumer	spending.			
	
The	failure	of	almost	all	mainstream	economists	to	foresee	the	global	financial	crisis	of	2008/9	
represents	a	remarkable	failure	of	financial	governance	(Bezemer	2010).		Just	a	year	before	the	
onset	of	the	great	recession	the	then	chairman	of	the	U.S.	Federal	Reserve	Ben	Bernanke	reported	
to	the	U.S.	House	of	Representatives	(Bernanke,	2007)	that	‘the	U.S.	economy	appears	likely	to	
expand	at	a	moderate	pace	over	the	second	half	of	2007,	with	growth	then	strengthening	a	bit	in	
2008	to	a	rate	close	to	the	economy's	underlying	trend.’	Global	financial	institutions	were	also	taken	
unawares.	In	August	2007,	the	IMF	was	able	to	argue	that	‘notwithstanding	recent	financial	market	
nervousness,	the	global	economy	remains	on	track	for	continued	robust	growth	in	2007	and	2008,	
although	at	a	somewhat	more	moderate	pace	than	2006.	Moreover,	downside	risks	to	the	economic	
outlook	seem	less	threatening	than	at	the	time	of	the	September	2006	World	Economic	Outlook.’	
(IMF,	2007).	
		
These	oversights	amount	to	a	systematic	failure	to	integrate	a	coherent	description	of	the	financial	
economy	into	models	and	policy	prescriptions	for	the	real	economy	(Keen	2011).	The	crisis	revealed	
painfully	that	the	apparent	economic	success	of	the	‘great	moderation’	was	largely	built	on	a	
growing	fragility	in	the	balance	sheets	of	firms,	households	and	nation	states	(Barwell	and	Burrows	
2011,	Koo	2011).	But	these	risks	remained	invisible	to	most	economists	and	unpredicted	by	the	
majority	of	economic	models.	In	the	wake	of	the	crisis,	economists	have	therefore	placed	a	renewed	
importance	on	the	task	of	understanding	the	behaviour	(and	in	particular	the	stability	or	instability)	
of	the	financial	economy	and	integrating	this	understanding	into	the	workings	of	the	real	economy.	
A	host	of	new	research	initiatives	and	the	re-emergence	of	some	earlier	schools	of	thought	bears	
witness	to	this	new	turn	in	economics	(Keen	2011,	Minsky	1994,	Turner	2013,	Wray	2012).		
	
Another	notable	shortcoming	of	traditional	economic	models	is	the	failure	to	account	properly	for	
the	stocks	and	flows	of	natural	resources	on	which	economic	activity	ultimately	depends.		The	
period	of	the	great	moderation	also	witnessed	a	progressive	decline	in	environmental	quality	across	
the	world:	in	particular,	in	relation	to	global	climate	change,	biodiversity	loss,	the	deforestation	and	
desertification	of	semi-arid	regions,	the	eutrophication	of	water	supplies	and	the	over-exploitation	
of	mineral	resources	(MEA	2005,	MGI	2013,	Rockström	et	al	2009,	Steffen	et	al	2015,	TEEB	2010,	
IPCC	2014,	Wiedmann	et	al	2013).	These	limitations	are	well-rehearsed	in	the	literature	from	
ecological	economics	(Daly	1972,	Meadows	et	al	1972,	Costanza	1989,	Daly	1996,	Costanza	et	al	
1997).	But	attempts	to	redress	them	have	been	partial	at	best.		
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One	of	the	reasons	for	this	is	a	fundamental	dilemma	which	haunts	debates	about	a	sustainable	
economy.	Conventional	formulations	for	achieving	prosperity	rely	on	a	continual	expansion	of	
consumer	demand.	More	is	deemed	better	in	the	received	wisdom,	even	when	the	wellbeing	
outcomes	from	increasingly	material	lives	are	tenuous.	But	expanding	consumer	demand	increases	
the	global	throughput	of	materials	and	the	consumption	of	fossil	fuels	and	threatens	the	
sustainability	of	the	ecosystems	on	which	prosperity	depends.	Continued	growth	of	the	kind	seen	
hitherto	is	patently	unsustainable.				
	
On	the	other	hand,	slowing	down,	or	reversing	economic	growth	appears	unpalatable	too.	Income	
growth	is	clearly	still	needed	in	the	poorest	countries	at	least,	where	it	is	highly	correlated	with	real	
wellbeing	outcomes.		Even	in	the	richest	economies,	growth	in	GDP	is	often	regarded	as	the	single	
most	important	policy	indicator	of	progress.	When	growth	falters,	as	it	did	in	the	crisis	of	2008/9	
incomes	fall,	high-street	spending	is	reduced	and	production	output	falls.	Businesses	have	less	to	
invest,	governments	have	lower	tax	revenues,	social	investment	is	withdrawn,	people	lose	their	jobs	
and	the	economy	begins	to	fall	into	a	spiral	of	recession.		In	short,	growth	may	be	unsustainable,	but	
de-growth	appears	to	be	unstable.					
	
Responding	to	the	dilemma	of	remaining	within	the	‘safe	operating	space’	(Rockström	2009,	Steffen	
et	al	2015)	of	a	finite	planet	in	a	growth-based	economy	has	often	been	construed	by	economists	
primarily	as	a	microeconomic	task	—	one	that	governments	can	address	with	conventional	fiscal	
instruments	of	tax	and	subsidy.	The	‘external’	costs	associated	with	economic	activities	should	be	
‘internalized’	in	market	prices,	according	to	familiar	axioms	(Pigou	1920,	Pearce	et	al	1989,	Pearce	
and	Turner	1990,	Ekins	1992).	Incorporating	‘shadow	prices’	for	environmental	goods	into	market	
prices	will	send	a	clear	signal	to	consumers	and	investors	about	the	real	costs	of	resource	
consumption	and	ecological	damage,	and	incentivize	investment	in	alternatives,	according	to	this	
conventional	wisdom.		
	
But	this	prescription	has	been	hard	to	implement	over	the	last	decades.	Fears	of	damaging	economic	
growth	have	led	politicians	to	shy	away	from	both	ecological	taxation	and	green	investment.	Recent	
attempts	to	overcome	this	fear	have	largely	focused	on	arguing	that	the	impacts	of	green	
investment	will	be	either	negligible	or	even	positive	in	terms	of	stimulating	growth	(NCE	2014).	But	it	
remains	an	uncomfortable	fact	that	fragile	private	and	public	sector	balance	sheets	have	slowed	
down	investment	in	the	real	economy	generally,	let	alone	the	additional	(and	less	familiar)	
investment	needed	to	make	a	transition	to	a	sustainable	economy.	Conventional	responses	have	
focussed	instead	on	cutting	public	spending	(austerity)	and	stimulating	consumption	growth	
(consumer	spending)	as	the	basis	for	economic	recovery.	Unfortunately,	these	responses	tend	to	
ignore	the	structural	problems	of	the	conventional	paradigm	and	delay	further	the	investment	
needed	to	make	the	transition	to	a	sustainable	green	economy.			
	
This	transition	demands	a	quite	specific	investment	portfolio	which	is	quantitatively	and	qualitatively	
different	from	the	investment	portfolio	that	has	characterised	the	prevailing	economic	system.	
Existing	investment	practices	tend	to	be	dominated	by	speculation	on	asset	prices	on	the	one	hand	
and	by	the	extraction	and	depletion	of	natural	resources	on	the	other.	Easy	returns	in	the	first	
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category	are	gained	at	the	cost	of	unstable	asset	prices	and	rising	inequality	(Credit	Suisse	2014,	nef	
2015).	Easy	returns	in	the	second	are	achieved	only	at	the	expense	of	resource	depletion	and	
environmental	degradation	(UNEP	2014).		As	these	easy	returns	begin	to	dissipate,	the	dominance	of	
extractive	investments	leads	to	portfolios	weakened	by	stranded	assets	(HSBC	2012)	with	potentially	
destabilising	effects	on	future	financial	markets.			
By	contrast,	the	investment	portfolio	for	a	sustainable	economy	consists	in	building	long-term	assets	
in	low	carbon	technology	and	infrastructure,	in	resource-efficient	manufacturing,	in	service	
provision,	in	health	care,	in	education,	in	public	spaces	and	social	goods,	and	in	the	protection	and	
restoration	of	habitats,	forests,	wetlands,	soils	and	other	natural	assets.		Some	of	these	asset	types	
may	offer	very	conventional	benefits	with	rates	of	return	comparable	to	existing	portfolios.		Others	
however	will	impose	considerable	challenges	on	existing	institutional	structures	and	financial	
architectures	because	their	very	real	environmental	and	social	benefits	are	not	reflected	in	market	
prices	and	financial	returns.		
The	scale	and	nature	of	this	dilemma	suggest	that	the	combined	challenges	of	climate	change,	
environmental	pressure,	and	resource	scarcity	require	macroeconomic	as	well	as	microeconomic	
responses.	In	fact,	there	is	a	need	to	develop	a	fully	consistent	ecological	macroeconomics	in	which	
it	is	possible	to	maintain	financial	stability,	ensure	high	levels	of	employment,	improve	the	
distribution	of	income	and	wealth	and	yet	remain	within	the	ecological	constraints	and	resource	
limits	of	a	finite	planet.		
In	short,	it	is	clear	that	an	approach	to	macroeconomics	configured	only	by	‘real	economy’	
aggregates	such	as	output,	productivity,	employment,	consumption	and	public	spending,	is	
insufficient	to	ensure	economic	sustainability,	let	alone	social	or	environmental	sustainability.	Nor	is	
it	sufficient	for	monetary	policy	to	consist	largely	in	laissez	faire	regulation	of	financial	markets	
combined	with	central	bank	interest	rate	policy	aimed	solely	at	‘inflation	targeting’.	These	forms	of	
monetary	policy	were	plainly	deficient	in	averting	the	crisis	and	insufficient	to	provide	recovery	from	
it.		For	two	decade	before	the	crisis,	this	same	architecture	signally	failed	to	provide	a	financial	
landscape	amenable	to	the	investment	needs	of	an	environmentally	sustainable	and	socially	
equitable	economy.	Building	a	more	appropriate	financial	system	needs	to	start	from	a	clear	
understanding	of	the	investment	needs	associated	with	the	transition	to	sustainable	economy.								
Numerous	questions	emerge	as	a	result	of	this	analysis.	These	include	questions:	about	the	
organisation	and	structure	of	asset	portfolios;	about	the	balance	between	public	and	private	finance;	
about	the	balance	between	equity	and	debt;	about	the	structure	and	distribution	of	asset	
ownership;	about	the	impacts	of	elevated	investments	on	prices,	on	wages	and	on	consumer	
demand;	and	about	the	appropriate	forms	of	horizontal	and	vertical	money.		Clearly,	addressing	
these	questions	demands	attention	to	both	the	real	and	the	financial	economy.		Explicitly,	it	also	
requires	a	framework	that	integrates	both	of	these	aspects	of	the	economy	–	in	the	context	of	
ecological	and	resource	constraints.		The	aim	of	this	paper	is	describe	several	approaches	to	this	
over-arching	problem,	building	on	the	theoretical	framework	of	stock-flow	consistent	(SFC)	
macroeconomic	modelling.		
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3	 A	Stock-Flow	Consistent	System	Dynamics	Framework	
The	intellectual	foundation	for	the	modelling	work	reported	in	this	Milestone	derive	from	a	view	of	
macroeconomics	developed	within	post-Keynesian	economic	theory.	We	draw	in	particular	from	the	
Stock-Flow	Consistent	(SFC)	approach	to	macro-economics,	pioneered	by	Copeland	(1949)	and	
developed	extensively	by	Wynne	Godley	and	others	over	the	last	decades	(Godley	and	Lavoie	2007,	
Lavoie	and	Godley	2001,	Lavoie	and	Zezza	2012).2		
The	overall	rationale	of	the	SFC	approach	is	to	account	consistently	for	all	monetary	flows	between	
agents	and	sectors	across	the	economy.		This	rationale	can	be	captured	in	three	broad	axioms:	first	
that	each	expenditure	from	a	given	actor	(or	sector)	is	also	the	income	to	another	actor	(or	sector);	
second,	that	each	sector’s	financial	assets	correspond	to	financial	liabilities	of	at	least	one	other	
sector,	with	the	sum	of	all	assets	and	liabilities	across	all	sectors	equalling	zero;	and	finally,	that	
changes	in	stocks	of	financial	assets	are	consistently	related	to	flows	within	and	between	economic	
sectors.		
These	simple	understandings	lead	to	a	set	of	accounting	principles	with	implications	for	actors	in	
both	the	real	and	financial	economy	which	can	be	used	to	test	any	economic	model	or	scenario	
prediction	for	consistency	as	a	possible	solution	in	the	real	world.	The	approach	has	come	to	the	fore	
in	the	wake	of	the	financial	crisis,	precisely	because	of	these	consistent	accounting	principles	and	the	
transparency	they	bring	to	an	understanding	not	just	of	conventional	macroeconomic	aggregates	
like	the	GDP	but	also	of	the	underlying	balance	sheets.		It	is	notable	that	Godley	(1999)	was	one	of	
the	few	economists	who	predicted	the	crisis	before	it	happened.	
The	approach	is	broadly	Keynesian	in	the	sense	that	SFC	models	tend	to	be	demand-driven,	and	the	
economy	is	articulated	in	terms	of	a	number	of	inter-related	financial	sector	accounts:	households,	
firms,	banks,	government,	central	bank	and	the	‘rest	of	the	world’	(or	foreign	sector).		The	accounts	
of	firms	and	banks	are	usually	further	subdivided	into	current	and	capital	accounts	in	line	with	
national	accounting	practices.	It	is	also	sometimes	useful	to	subdivide	individual	sectors	further.		For	
instance,	the	household	sector	can	be	subdivided	into	two	sectors		(see	Section	4	below)	in	order	to	
test	the	distributional	aspects	of	changes	in	the	real	or	financial	economy.				
Figure	1	illustrates	a	typical	model	structure	for	an	SFC	model	with	the	familiar	‘circular	flow’	of	the	
economy	visible	(in	red)	towards	the	bottom	left	of	the	diagram.	The	rather	more	complex	structure	
shown	(partially)	above	and	around	the	circular	flow	represents	financial	flows	of	the	monetary	
economy	in	the	banking,	government	and	foreign	sectors.			
If	the	model	is	stock-flow	consistent,	the	financial	flows	into	and	out	of	each	financial	sector	
consistently	sum	to	zero	at	each	point	of	time	along	the	model	run.		So,	for	instance,	the	incomes	of	
households	(consisting	of	wages	and	profits)	must	be	exactly	equal	to	the	outgoings	of	households	
(including	taxes,	net	interest	payments,	consumption	and	investment	spending,	and	net	acquisitions	
of	financial	assets).	Likewise,	for	each	other	sector	in	the	model.								
																																								 																				
2		 For	an	overview	of	the	literature	on	SFC	macroeconomic	modelling,	see	Caverzasi	and	Godin	2015.	
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Figure	1:	Illustrative	Macroeconomic	Structure	for	SFC	Model3	
The	stock	flow	consistent	approach	to	money	flows	within	an	economy	can	also	be	represented	in	
tabular	form,	as	illustrated	in	Tables	1	and	2.	Table	1	shows	an	illustrative	(and	simplified)	
‘transaction	flows’	matrix	for	a	closed	economy.			
The	matrix	creates	a	representation	of	all	the	transactions	between	different	financial	sectors	in	a	
given	period	(typically	a	year)	of	economic	activity.	It	will	be	noticed	that	the	production	firms	
account	is	split	into	a	current	account,	where	revenue	and	costs	are	settled,	and	a	capital	account	
where	the	funds	for	investment	reside.	This	split	between	current	and	capital	account	is	also	usually	
extended	also	to	financial	firms	(banks),	to	the	Central	Bank,	and	to	the	foreign	sector.		For	
illustrative	purposes	we	omit	these	accounts	in	Table	1.	
3 This	diagram	is	taken	from	the	version	of	the	FALSTAFF	model	reported	in	sections	5	and	6,	which	was	developed	
using	the	interactive	systems	dynamics	software	STELLA	at	the	University	of	Surrey	in	collaboration	with	York	
University	Toronto	(Jackson	and	Victor	2015).			
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Households (h) Firms (f)  Financial  sector (b) Central  Bank Gov (g) RoW (r) ∑ Current Capital Current Capital (cb) Consumption (C) −𝐶 𝐶 0 Gov spending (G) 𝐺 −𝐺 0 Investment (I) −𝐼! 𝐼! + 𝐼! −𝐼! 0 Exports (X) and imports (M) 𝑋 −𝑀 𝑀 − 𝑋 0 Wages (W) 𝑊 −𝑊 0 Profits (F) +𝑃!" + 𝑃! −𝑃! +𝑃!" −𝑃! 0 Taxes (T) −𝑇! −𝑇! − 𝑇! 𝑇 0 Interest on Loans (L) −𝑟!𝐿!!! −𝑟!𝐿!! +𝑟!𝐿!! 0 Interest on Deposits (D) +𝑟!𝐷!!! +𝑟!𝐷!!! −𝑟!𝐷!! +𝑟!𝐷!!! 0 Interest on Bonds (B) +𝑟!𝐵!!! +𝑟!𝐵!!! +𝑟!𝐵!!!" −𝑟!𝐵!! +𝑟!𝐵!!! 0 Change in Advances (A) +𝛥𝐴 −𝛥𝐴 0 Change in Reserves (R) −𝛥𝑅 +𝛥𝑅 0 Change in deposits (D) −𝛥𝐷! +𝛥𝐷 0 Change in bonds (B) −𝛥𝐵! −𝛥𝐵! −𝛥𝐵!" +𝛥𝐵 −𝛥𝐵!  0 Change in equities (E) −𝑝!𝛥𝐸 +𝑝!𝛥𝐸 0 Change in loans (L) +𝛥𝐿! +𝛥𝐿! 0 Change in mortgages (M) +𝛥𝑀 −𝛥𝑀 0 Change in pensions (N) −𝛥𝑁 +𝛥𝑁 0 ∑ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Table	1:Illustrative	Transaction	Matrix	for	SFC	Modelling	
	
	
	
9	|	P a g e 	
	
	 	
	
The	transaction	matrix	incorporates	an	account	of	the	incomes	and	expenditures	in	the	national	
economy,	reflecting	directly	the	structure	of	the	system	of	national	accounts.		Thus	the	first	ten	rows	
in	Table	1	illustrate	the	flow	accounts	of	each	sector.		In	terms	of	the	household	sector,	for	example,	
it	can	be	seen	that	households	receive	money	in	the	form	of	wages	and	distributed	profits	from	
production	firms,	while	spending	money	on	consumption	and	taxes.		
It	is	to	be	observed	that	the	first	six	rows	of	the	Firms	sector	(column	3	in	Table1)	present	a	
simplified	form	of	the	conventional	GDP	accounting	identity:		𝐶 +  𝐺 +  𝐼 =  𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑒 =  𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 =  𝑊 +  𝑃	 	 1)	
where	𝐺𝐷𝑃! 	represents	the	expenditure-based	formulation	of	the	Gross	Domestic	Product	and 𝐺𝐷𝑃! 	
represents	the	income	based	GDP	formulation.			
The	lower	portion	of	Table	1	shows	the	changes	in	financial	assets	and	liabilities	between	sectors.		So	
for	example	the	net	lending	of	the	households	sector	(the	sum	of	rows	1	to	10	in	column	2	of	Table	
1)	is	distributed	amongst	four	different	kinds	of	financial	assets	in	this	illustration:	deposits,	
government	bonds	and	equities.		Note	that	this	Table	is	for	illustrative	purposes	only.		Actual	
allocations	in	FALSTAFF	include	other	options,	including	the	taking	of	loans	and	mortgages	by	
households.			
A	key	feature	of	the	transaction	matrix,	indeed	the	core	principle	at	the	heart	of	SFC	modelling,	is	
that	each	of	the	rows	and	each	of	the	columns	must	always	sum	to	zero.		If	the	model	is	correctly	
constructed,	these	zero	balances	should	not	change	over	time	as	the	simulation	progress.		The	
accounting	identities	shown	in	Table	1	therefore	allow	for	a	consistency	check,	to	ensure	that	the	
simulations	actually	represent	possible	states	of	the	monetary	economy.		
Associated	with	the	transactions	illustrated	in	the	bottom	five	rows	of	Table	1	are	changes	in	the	
capital	accounts	of	each	economic	sector.		For	each	transaction	in	financial	assets	between	two	
sectors	of	the	economy	there	is	an	associated	change	in	the	balance	sheet	of	the	same	two	sectors.		
For	instance,	a	decision	by	the	household	sector	to	increase	deposits	at	banks	will	increase	the	
deposit	assets	of	households	while	simultaneously	increasing	deposit	liabilities	at	banks.			
The	balance	sheet	of	an	economy	(Table	2	below)	may	be	thought	of	as	providing	a	record	of	all	
previous	transactions	upon	which	the	transactions	in	the	current	period	are	added.	Changes	in	the	
balance	sheet	from	the	end	of	period	t-1	to	the	end	of	period	t	are	therefore	the	result	of	
transactions	occurring	in	period	t.		Typically	balance	sheet	data	are	collated	and	reported	on	an	
annual	basis	in	the	national	accounts.	One	of	the	key	financial	axioms	illustrated	in	Table	2	is	that	the	
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sum	of	all	financial	assets	and	liabilities	in	the	economy	is	zero.		The	only	net	assets	are	non-
financial,	derived	from	fixed	(and	non-produced)	capital.4			
		 Households	 Firms	 Banks	 Gov't	 Σ	
Loans	
	
-L	 +L	
	
0	
Deposits	(D)	 +D	
	
-D	
	
0	
Bonds	(B)	 +Bh	
	
+Bb	 -B	 0	
Equities	(E)	 +e	.	pe	 -ef	.	pe	
	 	
0	
Fixed	capital	(K)	 +Kh	 +Kf	
	 	
+K	
Net	worth	(NW)	 NWh	 NWf	 NWb	 NWg	 K	
Table	2:	Illustrative	Balance	Sheet	Matrix	for	a	Closed	Economy	
As	indicated	in	the	introduction,	this	milestone	reports	on	two	distinct	programmes	of	work	which	
have	contributed	to	the	outputs	from	the	WWWforEurope	project.		The	first	of	these	is	the	
modelling	approach	pursued	by	Surrey	which	builds	on	an	on-going	project	led	by	Prof	Tim	Jackson	
and	Prof	Peter	Victor	(York	University,	Toronto)	to	develop	a	stock-flow	consistent	(SFC)	ecological	
macro-economics.	The	broad	approach	has	several	distinct	features.		
In	the	first	place,	it	draws	together	three	primary	spheres	of	modelling	interest	and	explores	the	
interactions	between	them.		These	spheres	are:	1)	the	ecological	and	resource	constraints	on	
economic	activity;	2)	a	full	account	of	production,	consumption,	employment	and	public	finances	in	
the	‘real	economy’	at	the	level	of	the	nation	state;	3)	a	comprehensive	account	of	the	money	
economy,	including	the	main	interactions	between	financial	agents,	and	the	creation,	flow	and	
destruction	of	the	money	supply	itself.	Interactions	within	and	between	these	spheres	of	interest	are	
modelled,	using	a	system	dynamics	framework.5		
A	further	key	feature	of	the	Surrey	approach	is	the	focus	of	attention	on	the	individual	nation	state.		
A	premise	of	the	work	is	that	the	‘dilemma	of	growth’	has	particular	ramifications	for	national	policy	
and	is	best	explored	at	that	level.	The	growth	of	GDP	or	national	income	in	a	particular	country	is	not	
just	a	significant	policy	indicator	in	its	own	right,	it	is	also	a	measure	of	production	output	and	
																																								 																				
4		 These	real	assets	are	usually	restricted	to	assets	produced	by	the	economy	which	have	a	market	value	eg	
housing,	roads,	schools.	Other	valuable	assets	such	as	the	land	base	and	mineral	deposits	are	often	excluded	
although	efforts	are	underway	to	expand	national	balance	sheets	to	include	them.	(e.g.	United	Nations	et	al	
2003)				
5		 The	primary	modelling	platform	used	by	the	research	team	is	a	system	dynamics	platform	known	as	STELLA.	Data	
collation	organised	in	Excel	and	econometric	calibration	is	carried	out	in	Eviews.		
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consumption	possibilities,	as	well	as	being	related	to	a	country’s	ability	to	provide	citizens	with	work,	
finance	its	social	investment,	and	compete	in	global	markets.	Admittedly,	all	of	these	questions	
could	also	be	(and	often	are)	asked	at	supra-national	or	sub-national	level.		Since	the	development	
of	a	unified	System	of	National	Accounts	(UN	1993,	2008),	however,	the	most	comprehensive,	
reliable	and	consistent	data	sets	tend	to	be	available	at	country	and	national	level.			
The	work	led	by	Surrey	has	so	far	developed	three	related	macro-economic	models.	The	SIGMA	
model	(Section	4)	employs	a	somewhat	simplified	version	of	the	broader	modelling	structure	to	
explore	the	relationship	between	savings,	inequality	and	growth	in	a	macroeconomic	framework.		
We	address	in	particular	the	hypothesis	advanced	by	Thomas	Piketty	that	declining	growth	rates	
lead	inevitably	towards	rising	social	inequality.			
The	FALSTAFF	model	(Sections	5	and	6)	is	a	more	extensive	representation	of	the	macro-economy	
incorporating	a	wider	variety	of	financial	assets	and	liabilities	in	a	stock-flow	consistent	framework.		
We	illustrate	the	use	of	FALSTAFF	by	exploring	(Section	5)	the	so-called	‘growth	imperative’	which	is	
supposed	(Binswanger	2009	eg)	to	arise	from	the	creation	of	money	alongside	interest-bearing	debt,	
and	also	(Section	6)	the	financial	and	monetary	implications	of	large-scale	green	investment	
scenarios.				
Finally,	the	GEMMA	model	(which	is	still	under	development	–	see	Section	8)	builds	on	the	FALSTAFF	
framework	to	include	greater	inter-industry	structure	and	more	extended	behavioural	dynamics	–	
including	for	instance	an	econometrically	estimated	portfolio	allocation	function	for	household	
assets	and	liabilities.			
The	second	strand	of	work	has	been	developed	independently	through	the	University	of	Vienna.		The	
ECOGRO	model	(Section	7)	is	a	stock-flow	consistent	model	calibrated	to	the	level	of	the	EU	as	a	
whole.	It	incorporates	two	specific	environmental	extensions	to	the	conventional	stock-flow	
consistent	framework.	One	of	these	expands	the	structure	of	nonfinancial	firms	to	incorporate	a	
separate	energy	sector.	The	other	incorporates	an	environmental	damage	function	which	impacts	on	
the	capital	stock.					
The	following	sections	of	the	paper	provide	an	overview	of	the	different	approaches	taken	and	
report	in	the	findings.		Further	details	on	each	approach	are	to	be	found	in	the	references.	
	 	
	
	
	
12	|	P a g e 	
	
	 	
	
4	 Does	slow	growth	lead	to	rising	inequality?		
The	French	economist,	Thomas	Piketty	(2014),	has	received	widespread	acclaim	for	his	book	Capital	
in	the	21st	Century.	Building	on	over	700	pages	of	painstaking	statistical	analysis,	the	central	thesis	
of	the	book	is	nonetheless	relatively	straightforward	to	describe.	Piketty	argues	that	the	increase	in	
inequality	witnessed	in	recent	decades	is	a	direct	result	of	the	slowing	down	of	economic	growth	in	
modern	capitalist	economies.	Under	circumstances	in	which	growth	rates	decline	further,	he	
suggests,	this	challenge	would	be	exacerbated.		
	
Piketty	advances	his	argument	through	the	formulation	of	two	‘fundamental	laws’	of	capitalism.	The	
first	of	these	(Piketty	2014:	52	et	seq)	relates	the	capital	stock	(more	precisely	the	capital	to	income	
ratio	𝛽)	to	the	share	of	income	α	flowing	to	the	owners	of	capital.	Specifically,	the	first	fundamental	
law	of	capitalism	says	that:6		
	 𝛼 =  𝑟𝛽,	 	 	 	 	 (1)	
	
where	r	is	the	rate	of	return	on	capital.	Since	𝛽 is	defined	as	K/Y	where	K	is	capital	and	Y	is	income,	it	
is	easy	to	see	that	this	‘law’	is,	as	Piketty	acknowledges,	an	accounting	identity:		
	 𝛼𝑌 =  𝑟𝐾.	 	 	 	 	 (2)	
	
Formally	speaking,	the	income	accruing	to	capital	equals	the	total	capital	multiplied	by	the	rate	of	
return	on	that	capital.	Though	this	‘law’	on	its	own	does	not	force	the	economy	in	one	direction	or	
another,	it	provides	the	foundation	from	which	to	explore	the	evolution	of	historical	relationships	
between	capital,	income	and	rates	of	return.		In	particular,	it	can	be	seen	from	this	identity	that	for	
any	given	rate	of	return	r	the	share	of	income	accruing	to	the	owners	of	capital	rises	as	the	capital	to	
income	ratio	rises.7		
	
It	is	the	second	of	Piketty’s	‘fundamental	laws	of	capitalism’	(op	cit:	168	et	seq;	see	also	Piketty	
2010)	that	generates	particular	concern	in	the	context	of	declining	growth	rates.	This	law	states	that	
in	the	long	run,	the	capital	to	income	ratio	β	tends	towards	the	ratio	of	the	savings	rate	s	to	the	
growth	rate	g,	ie:		
	
																																								 																				
6		 In	what	follows,	we	suppress	specific	reference	to	time-dependency	of	variables	except	where	absolutely	
necessary.	Thus	all	variables	should	be	read	as	time	dependent	unless	specifically	denominated	with	a	
subscripted	suffix	0.	Occasionally,	we	will	have	reason	to	use	the	subscripted	suffix	(-1)	to	denote	the	first	lag	of	a	
time-dependent	variable.		
7		 We	will	see	later	that	the	ceteris	paribus	clause	relating	to	constant	r	here	is	important.	In	fact,	the	rate	of	return	
will	typically	change	as	the	capital	to	income	ratio	rises;	and	to	the	extent	that	this	ratio	declines	with	increasing	
β,	it	can	potentially	mitigate	the	accumulation	of	the	capital	share	of	income.		
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	 	 	 	 	 𝛽 → !!  𝑎𝑠 𝑡 → ∞.	 	 	 	 (3)	
	
This	asymptotic	law	suggests	that,	as	growth	rates	fall	towards	zero,	the	capital	to	income	ratio	will	
tend	to	rise	dramatically	–	depending	of	course	on	what	happens	to	savings	rates.	Taken	together	
with	the	first	law,	equation	(3)	suggests	that	over	the	long	term,	capital’s	share	of	income	is	
governed	by	the	following	relationship:		
	
	 	 	 	 	 𝛼 →  𝑟 !!  𝑎𝑠 𝑡 → ∞.		 	 	 	 (4)	
	
In	other	words,	as	growth	declines,	the	rising	capital	to	income	ratio	𝛽	leads	to	an	increasing	share	
of	income	going	to	capital	and	a	declining	share	of	income	going	to	labour.	It	is	important	to	stress	
that	the	relationships	(3)	and	(4)	are	long-term	equilibria	to	which	the	economy	evolves,	provided	
that	the	savings	rate	s	and	the	growth	rate	g	stay	constant.		As	Piketty	points	out,	‘the	accumulation	
of	wealth	takes	time:	it	will	take	several	decades	for	the	law	β	=	s/g	to	become	true’	(op	cit:	168).	In	
any	real	economy,	the	growth	rate	g	and	the	savings	rate	s	are	likely	to	be	changing	continually,	so	
that	at	any	point	in	time,	the	economy	is	striving	towards,	but	may	never	in	fact	achieve,	the	
asymptotic	result.			
	
Piketty’s	hypothesis	poses	a	particular	challenge	to	those	economists	who	have	been	critical	of	
society’s	‘GDP	fetish’	(Stiglitz	et	al	2009)	and	sought	to	establish	alternative	approaches	(Daly	1996,	
Victor	2008,	Jackson	2009,	Rezai	et	al	2012,	d’Alisa	et	al	2014)	in	which	socio-economic	goals	are	
achieved	without	assuming	continual	throughput	growth.	Certainly,	the	prospects	for	‘prosperity	
without	growth’	(Jackson	2009)	would	appear	slim	at	best	if	Piketty’s	thesis	were	unconditionally	
true.		The	Piketty	hypothesis	is	also	problematic	in	the	face	of	a	potential	‘secular	stagnation’	
(Gordon	2012),	in	which	declining	growth	rates	are	a	feature	of	the	national	or	global	macro-
economy.				
	
In	order	to	explore	further	the	Piketty	hypothesis,	Jackson	and	Victor	(2014,	2015)	developed	a	
closed,	SFC,	demand-driven	model	of	Savings,	Investment	and	Growth	in	a	Macroeconomic	
framework	(SIGMA).	SIGMA	was	used	to	test	for	the	implications	of	a	slowdown	of	growth	on	a)	
capital’s	share	of	income	and	b)	the	distribution	of	incomes	in	the	economy.		Policy	options	to	
reduce	inequality	were	also	examined.			
	
SIGMA		has	four	financial	sectors:	households,	government,	firms	and	banks.	Firms’	and	banks’	
accounts	are	divided	between	current	and	capital	accounts	and	the	households	sector	is	further	
subdivided	into	two	subsectors	(which	we	denominate	as	‘workers’	and	‘capitalists’)	in	order	to	
explore	potential	inequalities	in	the	distribution	of	incomes	and	of	wealth.	By	adding	a	government	
sector	to	the	model,	we	are	able	to	explore	the	potential	to	mitigate	regressive	impacts	through	a	
	
	
	
14	|	P a g e 	
	
	 	
	
progressive	taxation	system.	The	inclusion	of	a	banking	sector	allows	us	to	establish	clear	
relationships	between	the	real	and	the	financial	economy	and	discuss	questions	of	household	
wealth.	Before	describing	SIGMA	in	more	detail,	we	first	summarise	Piketty’s	argument.		
	
The	model	itself	is	built	using	the	system	dynamics	software	STELLA.	This	kind	of	software	provides	a	
useful	platform	for	exploring	economic	systems	for	several	reasons,	not	the	least	of	which	is	the	
ease	of	undertaking	collaborative,	interactive	work	in	a	visual	(iconographic)	environment.	Further	
advantages	are	the	transparency	with	which	one	can	model	fully	dynamic	relationships	and	mirror	
the	stock-flow	consistency	that	underlies	our	approach	to	macroeconomic	modelling.		
	
Following	much	of	the	SFC	literature,	the	model	is	broadly	Keynesian	in	the	sense	that	it	is	demand-
driven.	Our	approach	is	to	establish	a	level	of	overall	demand	through	an	exogenous	growth	rate,	𝑔,	
and	to	generate	the	level	of	investment	through	an	exogenous	savings	rate,	𝑠.	We	then	explore	the	
impacts	of	changes	in	these	variables	over	time	on	the	income	shares	from	capital	and	labour	
through	an	endogenous	rate	of	return,	𝑟,	on	capital.	To	achieve	this	we	employ	a	constant	elasticity	
of	substitution	(CES)	production	function,	not	to	drive	output	as	in	a	conventional	neoclassical	
model,	but	to	derive	the	marginal	productivity	𝑟!  of	capital	𝐾	and	also	to	establish	the	labour	
employment	associated	with	a	given	level	of	aggregate	demand.8		
	
To	illustrate	our	arguments	without	unnecessary	complications,	we	work	with	a	simplified	version	of	
the	more	complex	structure	that	we	have	developed	elsewhere.	First,	as	noted,	the	SIGMA	economy	
is	closed	with	respect	to	overseas	trade.	Next,	we	assume	that	government	always	balances	the	
fiscal	budget	and	holds	no	outstanding	debt,	so	that	government	spending,	𝐺,	is	equal	to	taxes,	𝑇,	
levied	only	on	households.		
	
Finally,	we	employ	a	rather	simple	balance	sheet	structure,	sufficient	only	to	get	a	handle	on	
changes	in	household	wealth	under	different	patterns	of	ownership	of	capital.	Households	assets	are	
held	either	as	deposits,	𝐷,	in	banks	or	as	equities,	𝐸,	in	firms.	The	only	other	item	on	the	balance	
sheet	is	loans,	𝐿,	made	by	banks	to	non-financial	firms.	The	banking	sector	plays	a	relatively	
straightforward	role	as	a	financial	intermediary,	providing	deposit	facilities	for	households	and	loans	
to	firms.		
	
Clearly	none	of	these	assumptions	is	accurate	as	a	full	description	of	a	modern	capitalist	economy,	
but	all	of	them	can	be	relaxed	in	more	sophisticated	versions	of	our	framework	and	none	of	them	
obstructs	our	purposes	in	this	study.			
																																								 																				
8		 We	are	aware	of	course	of	the	limitations	of	using	a	broadly	neoclassical	production	function	(Cohen	and	
Harcourt	2003,	Robinson	1953).	However,	retaining	this	aspect	of	Piketty’s	analysis	allows	us	to	compare	our	
findings	more	directly	with	his.						
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Household	savings	are	distributed	between	new	bank	deposits,	𝛥𝐷,	and	the	purchase	of	equities,	𝛥𝐸,	from	firms.	It	is	assumed	for	simplicity	that	the	demand	for	new	equities	by	households	is	equal	
to	the	supply	of	new	equities	by	firms	and	that	these	in	their	turn	are	determined	via	a	desired	debt	
to	equity	ratio	in	firms.9	The	distribution	of	equity	purchases	between	capitalist	and	worker	
households	is	deemed	to	be	in	the	same	proportion	as	the	net	savings	of	each	sector.	Changes	in	
deposits	are	then	calculated	as	a	residual	from	net	savings.		
		
In	order	to	model	the	evolution	of	the	SIGMA	economy	over	time,	we	follow	Piketty	by		defining	the	
evolution	of	the	net	national	income	𝑁𝐼	according	to	an	(exogenous)	growth	rate	𝑔	such	that:		
	 𝑁𝐼 = 1 + 𝑔 ∗ 𝑁𝐼(!!)	 	 	 	 (4)	 	
	
where	𝑁𝐼(!!)	is	the	value	in	the	previous	period	(ie	the	first	lag)	of	the	variable	𝑁𝐼.	In	some	
scenarios	𝑔	will	take	a	fixed	value	𝑔!	throughout	the	period	𝜏	of	the	scenario,10	while	in	others	𝑔	will	
decline	uniformly	from	𝑔!	to	zero	over	time	t.	
	
Testing	Piketty’s	hypothesis	requires	that	we	establish	the	rate	of	return	to	capital,	𝑟,	which	in	turn	
allows	us	to	determine	the	split	between	wages	and	firms	profits	in	the	net	national	income.	Along	
with	Piketty	(2014a:	213-214),	we	assume	(for	now)	that	the	return	to	capital	is	given	by	the	
marginal	productivity	of	capital,	which	we	denote	by	𝑟!.	This	assumption	only	works	under	market	
conditions	in	which	there	are	no	structural	features	which	might	lead	either	capital	or	labour	to	
extort	more	than	their	‘fair’	share	of	the	output	from	production.	
	
	In	a	sense,	this	assumption	is	a	conservative	one	for	us,	to	the	extent	that	conclusions	about	
inequality	are	stronger	in	imperfect	market	dynamics.	Under	conditions	of	duress,	in	which	the	
owners	of	capital	receive	a	rate	of	return	𝑟	greater	than	the	marginal	productivity	of	capital	𝑟!,	our	
conclusions	about	any	inequality	which	results	from	declining	growth	rates	will	be	reinforced.	
Conversely,	of	course,	we	must	beware	of	making	too	strong	assumptions	about	the	potential	to	
mitigate	inequality,	in	any	situation	in	which	the	owners	of	capital	have	greater	bargaining	power	
than	wage	labour.			
	
The	results	of	our	analysis	are	described	in	detail	in	Jackson	and	Victor	(2015a)	and	summarised	in	
Figures	2	and	3.		The	analysis	confirms	that,	under	certain	conditions,	it	is	indeed	possible	for	both	
capital’s	share	of	income	and	income	inequality	to	rise	substantially	as	growth	rates	decline.	
																																								 																				
9		 In	contrast	to	our	treatment	elsewhere	(Jackson	and	Victor	2015),	this	means	that	there	is	no	speculative	
purchasing	of	equities	that	might	lead	to	capital	gains	and	losses.			
10		 In	this	paper	we	take𝜏 = 100,	ie	the	scenarios	run	over	100	years.			
	
	
	
16	|	P a g e 	
	
	 	
	
However,	we	have	also	established	that	there	is	absolutely	no	inevitability	at	all	that	a	declining	
growth	rate	leads	to	explosive	(or	even	increasing)	levels	of	inequality.		
	
	
Figure	2:	The	variation	of	capital’s	share	of	income	with	elasticity	of	substitution	of	capital	
Source:	Jackson	and	Victor	2015a	
	
Even	under	a	highly-skewed	initial	distribution	of	ownership	of	productive	assets,	it	is	entirely	
possible	to	envisage	scenarios	in	which	incomes	converge	over	the	longer-term,	with	relatively	
modest	intervention	from	progressive	taxation	policies.		Specifically	when	the	elasticity	of	
substitution	between	capital	and	labour	is	low	(0.5),	with	a	differential	tax	rate	of	40%	on	higher	
level	incomes	and	a	modest	tax	on	capital	assets	(around	1.25%),	it	is	possible	to	reduce	the	
inequality	between	‘workers’	and	‘capitalists’	entirely	(Figure	3).			
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Figure	3:	Variations	in	income	inequality	under	a	progressive	tax	regime	
Source:	Jackson	and	Victor	2015a	
	
The	most	critical	factor	in	this	analysis	is	the	elasticity	of	substitution,	𝜎,	between	labour	and	capital.	
This	parameter	indicates	the	ease	with	which	it	is	possible	to	substitute	capital	for	labour	in	the	
economy	as	relative	prices	change.	Higher	levels	of	substitutability	(𝜎 > 1)	do	indeed	exhibit	the	
kind	of	rapid	increases	in	inequality	predicted	by	Piketty,	as	growth	rates	decline.	In	an	economy	
with	a	lower	elasticity	of	substitution	(0 < 𝜎 < 1),	the	dangers	are	much	less	acute.	The	ease	with	
which	capital	can	be	substituted	for	labour	is	thus	an	indicator	of	the	propensity	for	low	growth	
environments	to	lead	to	rising	inequality.	More	rigid	capital-labour	divisions	on	the	other	hand	
appear	to	reinforce	our	ability	to	reduce	societal	inequality.			
	
From	a	conventional	economic	viewpoint,	this	might	appear	to	be	cold	comfort.	Lower	values	of	σ	
are	often	equated	with	lower	levels	of	development.	As	Piketty	points	out	(2014a:	222),	low	levels	of	
elasticity	characterised	traditional	agricultural	societies.	Other	authors	have	suggested	that	the	
direction	of	modern	development,	in	general,	is	associated	with	rising	elasticities	between	labour	
and	capital	(Karagiannis	et	al	2005).		Antony	(2009a)	and	Palivos	(2008)	both	argue	that	typical	
empirical	values	of	𝜎	are	less	than	one	for	developing	countries	and	above	one	for	developed	
countries.	The	suggestion	in	the	literature	appears	to	be	that	progress	comprises	a	continual	shift	
towards	higher	levels	of	σ.	But	this	contention	embodies	numerous	ideological	assumptions.		In	
particular	it	seems	to	be	consistent	with	a	particular	form	of	capitalism	that	has	characterised	the	
post-war	period:	a	form	of	capitalism	that	has	come	under	increasing	scrutiny	for	its	potent	failures,	
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not	the	least	of	which	is	the	extent	to	which	it	has	presided	over	continuing	inequality	(Davidson	
2013,	Galbraith	2013).			
	
The	possibility	of	re-examining	this	assumption	resonates	strongly	with	suggestions	in	the	literature	
for	addressing	the	challenge	of	maintaining	full	employment	under	declining	growth.	In	our	own	
work,	for	example,	we	have	responded	to	this	challenge	by	highlighting	the	importance	of	labour-
intensive	services	both	in	reducing	material	burdens	across	society	and	also	in	creating	employment	
in	the	face	of	declining	growth	(Jackson	2009;	Jackson	and	Victor	2011).	The	findings	from	the	
SIGMA	model	support	this	view.	In	fact,	with	constant	labour	productivity	growth	of	1.8%	per	
annum,	unemployment	rises	to	over	70%	in	the	SIGMA	scenarios	(Figure	4:	scenario	1),	a	situation	
that	would	clearly	be	disastrous	for	any	society.		
	
	
Figure	4:	Unemployment	scenarios	under	declining	growth	
Source:	Jackson	and	Victor	2015a	
	
Suppose,	however,	that	labour	productivity	were	not	to	grow	continually.	This	could	potentially	lead	
to	an	important	avenue	of	opportunity	for	structural	change	in	pursuit	of	sustainability.	Instead	of	a	
relentless	pursuit	of	ever-increasing	labour	productivity,	economic	policy	would	aim	to	protect	
employment	as	a	priority	and	recognise	that	the	time	spent	in	labour	is	a	vital	component	of	the	
value	of	many	economic	activities	(Jackson	2011).	Increased	employment	opportunities	would	be	
achieved	through	a	structural	transition	to	more	labour	intensive	sectors	of	the	economy	(Jackson	
and	Victor	2011).	This	would	make	particular	sense	for	service-based	activities	–	for	instance	in	the	
care,	craft	and	cultural	sectors	–	where	the	value	of	the	activities	resides	largely	in	the	time	people	
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devote	to	them.	In	policy	terms,	such	a	transition	would	involve	protecting	the	quality	and	intensity	
of	people’s	time	in	the	workplace	from	the	interests	of	aggressive	capital.	Such	a	proposal	is	not	a	
million	miles	from	Minsky’s	(1986)	suggestion	that	government	should	act	as	‘employer	of	last	
resort’	in	stabilising	an	unstable	economy.			
	
Scenarios	2	to	4	in	Figure	4	all	describe	a	situation	in	which	by	the	end	of	the	run,	labour	productivity	
growth	has	declined	to	a	point	where	it	is	slightly	negative.	By	the	end	of	the	scenario,	labour	
productivity	itself	is	declining	in	the	economy	–	production	output	is	becoming	more	labour	
intensive.	Figure	4	reveals	that	this	decline	in	labour	productivity	growth	is	not	in	itself	sufficient	to	
ensure	acceptable	levels	of	unemployment.	For	higher	values	of	σ,	unemployment	is	still	running	
dangerously	high.	But	for	lower	values	of	σ	it	is	possible	not	only	to	maintain	but	even	to	improve	
the	level	of	employment	in	the	economy,	in	spite	of	a	decline	in	the	growth	rate	to	zero.		
	
There	is	however	a	tantalising	suggestion	inherent	in	this	analysis	that	changing	the	elasticity	of	
substitution	between	labour	and	capital	offers	another	potential	avenue	towards	a	more	sustainable	
macro-economy,	and	in	particular	a	way	of	mitigating	the	pernicious	impacts	of	inequality	and	
unemployment	in	a	low	growth	economy.	Exploring	that	suggestion	fully	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	
paper,	but	is	certainly	worth	flagging	here.	We	should	also	recall	here	our	assumption	that	the	rate	
of	return	to	capital	is	equal	to	the	marginal	productivity	of	capital.		As	we	remarked	earlier,	this	
assumption	only	holds	in	markets	conditions	where	capital	is	unable	to	use	its	power	to	command	a	
higher	share	of	income.	Clearly,	in	some	of	the	scenarios	we	have	envisaged,	this	assumption	may	no	
longer	hold.	Where	political	power	accumulates	alongside	the	accumulation	of	capital,	the	danger	of	
rising	inequality	is	particularly	severe	and	is	no	longer	offset	simply	by	changes	in	the	economic	
structure.	This	question	also	warrants	further	analysis.		
	
In	summary,	the	SIGMA	model	explores	the	relationship	between	growth,	savings	and	income	
inequality,	under	a	variety	of	assumptions	about	the	nature	and	structure	of	the	economy.		Our	
principal	finding	is	that	rising	inequality	is	by	no	means	inevitable,	even	in	the	context	of	declining	
growth	rates.	A	key	policy	conclusion	concerns	the	need	to	protect	wage	labour	against	aggressive	
cost-reducing	strategies	to	favour	the	interests	of	capital.	This	measure	would	have	the	additional	
benefit	of	maintaining	high	employment,	even	in	a	low-	or	degrowth	economy.			
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5	 FALSTAFF	Part	1	–	Credit	creation	and	the	‘growth	imperative’	
It	has	been	argued	that	capitalism	has	an	inherent	‘growth	imperative’:	in	other	words,	that	there	
are	certain	features	of	capitalism	which	are	inimical	to	a	stationary	state11	of	the	real	economy.	This	
argument	has	its	roots	in	the	writings	of	Karl	Marx	(1848)	and	Rosa	Luxemburg	(1913)	and	there	are	
good	reasons	to	take	it	seriously.	For	instance,	under	certain	conditions,	the	desire	of	entrepreneurs	
to	maximise	profits	will	lead	to	the	pursuit	of	labour	productivity	gains	in	production.	Unless	the	
economy	grows	over	time,	aggregate	labour	demand	will	fall,	leading	to	a	‘productivity	trap’	
(Jackson	and	Victor	2011)	in	which	higher	and	higher	levels	of	unemployment	can	only	be	offset	by	
continued	economic	growth.		
	
Our	concern	in	this	section	is	to	address	one	particular	aspect	of	the	growth	imperative:	namely,	the	
question	of	interest-bearing	debt.		A	variety	of	authors	have	suggested	that	when	money	is	created	
in	parallel	with	interest-bearing	debt	it	inevitably	creates	a	growth	imperative.	To	some,	the	charging	
of	interest	on	debt	is	itself	an	underlying	driver	for	economic	growth.	In	the	absence	of	growth,	it	is	
argued,	it	would	be	impossible	to	service	interest	payments	and	repay	debts,	which	would	therefore	
accumulate	unsustainably.	This	claim	was	made,	for	instance,	by	Richard	Douthwaite	(1990,	2006).	
In	The	Ecology	of	Money,	Douthwaite	(2006)	suggests	that	the	‘fundamental	problem	with	the	debt	
method	of	creating	money	is	that,	because	interest	has	to	be	paid	on	almost	all	of	it,	the	economy	
must	grow	continuously	if	it	is	not	to	collapse.’		
	
This	view	has	been	influential	amongst	a	range	of	economists	critical	of	capitalism,	and	in	particular	
those	critical	of	the	system	of	creation	of	money	through	interest-bearing	debt.	Eisenstein	(2012)	
maintains	that	‘our	present	money	system	can	only	function	in	a	growing	economy.	Money	is	
created	as	interest-bearing	debt:	it	only	comes	into	being	when	someone	promises	to	pay	back	even	
more	of	it’.		In	similar	vein,	Farley	et	al	(2013)	claim	that	the	‘current	interest-bearing,	debt-based	
system	of	money	creation	stimulates	the	unsustainable	growth	economy’	(op	cit:	2803).	The	same	
authors	seek	to	identify	policies	that	‘would	limit	the	growth	imperative	created	by	an	interest-
based	credit	creation	system’	(op	cit:	2823).		
	
The	popular	understanding	that		debt-based	money	as	a	form	of	growth	imperative	is	intuitively	
appealing,	but	has	been	subject	to	remarkably	little	in-depth	economic	scrutiny.	A	notable	exception	
is	a	landmark	paper	by	Mathias	Binswanger	(2009),	who	set	out	to	provide	an	‘explanation	for	a	
growth	imperative	in	modern	capitalist	economies,	which	are	also	credit	money	economies’	(op	cit:	
																																								 																				
11		 We	use	the	term	stationary	state	to	describe	zero	growth	in	the	Gross	Domestic	Product	(GDP).		We	prefer	here	
stationary	to	steady	state,	which	is	also	widely	used	(Daly	2014	eg),	for	two	reasons.	First,	the	term	steady	state	is	
employed	in	the	post-Keynesian	literature	(Godley	and	Lavoie	2007)	to	describe	a	state	of	the	economy	in	which	
flows	are	constant;	but	this	may	still	entail	growth.		A	stationary	state	is	used	to	describe	a	state	in	which	both	
flows	and	stocks	are	constant,	in	which	case	there	is	no	growth.		Second,	this	terminology	harks	back	to	early	
classical	economists	such	as	Mill	(1848),	emphasising	the	pedigree	of	the	idea	of	a	non-growth-based	economy.	
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707).	As	a	result	of	the	ability	of	commercial	banks	to	create	money	through	the	expansion	of	credit,	
he	claims	(op	cit:	724),	‘a	zero	growth	rate	is	not	feasible	in	the	long	run’.		
	
By	his	own	admission,	however,	Binswanger’s	paper	‘does	not	aim	to	give	a	full	description	of	a	
modern	capitalist	economy’.	In	particular,	he	notes	(op	cit:	711)	that	his	model	‘should	be	
distinguished	from	some	recent	modeling	attempts	in	the	Post	Keynesian	tradition’	which	set	out	to	
provide	‘comprehensive,	fully	articulated,	theoretical	models’	that	could	serve	as	a	‘blueprint	for	an	
empirical	representation	of	a	whole	economic	system’	(Godley	1999:	394).	A	recent	symposium	on	
the	growth	imperative	has	contributed	several	new	perspectives	on	Binswanger’s	original	
hypothesis,	but	these	papers	also	fall	short	of	providing	a	full	analysis	of	this	kind	(Binswanger	2015,	
Rosenblum	2015).	Our	aim	in	this	section	is	to	address	this	limitation,	in	the	context	of	a	stock-flow	
consistent	model,	calibrated	with	empirically	plausible	data.		
	
To	this	end,	we	have	developed	a	macroeconomic	model	of	Financial	Assets	and	Liabilities	in	a	Stock	
and	Flow	consistent	Framework	(FALSTAFF),	calibrated	at	the	level	of	the	national	economy	(Jackson	
and	Victor	2015b).	As	with	the	SIGMA	model	(Section	4),	the	approach	is	broadly	post-Keynesian	in	
the	sense	that	the	model	is	demand-driven	and	incorporates	a	consistent	account	of	all	monetary	
flows.	The	full	FALSTAFF	model	is	articulated	in	terms	of	six	inter-related	financial	sector	accounts:	
households,	firms,	banks,	government,	central	bank	and	the	‘rest	of	the	world’	(foreign	sector).	The	
accounts	of	firms	and	banks	are	further	subdivided	into	current	and	capital	accounts	in	line	with	
national	accounting	practices.	The	household	sector	can	be	further	subdivided	into	two	sectors	in	
order	to	test	the	distributional	aspects	of	changes	in	the	real	or	financial	economy.12	For	the	
purposes	of	this	analysis,	we	have	simplified	the	FALSTAFF	structure	(denoted	here	as	FALSTAFFS)	in	
order	to	focus	specifically	on	the	question	of	interest-bearing	money.	For	instance,	we	assume	
balanced	trade	and	restrict	the	number	of	categories	of	assets	and	liabilities	to	include	only	loans,	
deposits,	equities	and	government	bonds.		
	
The	broad	structure	of	the	FALSTAFFS	model	is	as	follows.	Aggregate	demand	is	composed	of	
household	spending,	government	spending,	and	the	investment	expenditure	of	firms.13	The	
allocation	of	gross	income	is	split	between	the	depreciation	of	fixed	capital	(which	is	assumed	to	be	
retained	by	firms),	the	return	to	labour	(the	wage	bill)	and	the	return	to	capital	(profits,	dividends	
and	interest	payments).		
	
Households’	propensity	to	consume	is	dependent	both	on	income	and	on	financial	wealth	(Godley	
and	Lavoie	2007).	The	model	also	incorporates	the	possibility	of	exploring	two	kinds	of	exogenous	
																																								 																				
12		 We	have	used	this	subdivision	to	explore	the	implications	of	Piketty’s	(2014)	hypothesis	that	inequality	increases	
as	the	growth	rate	declines	(Jackson	and	Victor	2015b).	
13		 For	simplicity,	we	assume	for	the	purposes	of	this	paper	a	balanced	trade	position	in	which	exports	are	equal	to	
imports	and	net	trade	is	zero.		
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‘shocks’	to	household	spending.	In	the	first,	a	random	adjustment	is	made	to	household	spending	
throughout	the	run,	within	a	range	of	plus	or	minus	2.5%	from	the	predicted	value.	In	the	second,	a	
one-off	shock	either	reduces	or	increases	spending	by	5%	over	two	consecutive	periods	early	in	the	
run.	We	use	these	exogenous	shocks	to	test	the	stability	of	the	stationary	state	under	our	default	
assumptions.		
	
Household	savings	may	in	principle	be	distributed	between	government	bonds,	firms	equities,	banks	
equities,	bank	deposits	and	loans.14	Household	demand	for	bonds	is	assumed	here	to	be	equal	to	the	
excess	supply	of	bonds	from	government,	once	banks’	demands	for	bonds	are	met.	Household	
demand	for	equities	is	assumed	to	be	equal	to	the	issuance	of	equities	from	firms	and	banks.	Thus,	
households	are	the	sole	owners	of	equity	in	this	model	and	the	return	on	equities	is	limited	to	
dividends	received,	since	there	are	no	capital	gains	in	the	model.15	The	balance	of	household	savings,	
once	bond	and	equity	purchases	have	been	made,	is	allocated	to	paying	down	loans	or	building	up	
deposits.	If	savings	are	negative,	households	may	also	borrow	from	banks	to	finance	spending.		
	
Firms	are	assumed	to	produce	goods	and	services	on	demand	for	households,	governments	and	to	
meet	the	demand	for	gross	fixed	capital	investment.	Investment	decisions	are	based	on	a	flexible	
accelerator	function	(Jorgenson	1963,	Godley	and	Lavoie	2007)	in	which	net	investment	is	assumed	
to	be	a	fixed	proportion	of	the	difference	between	capital	stock	in	the	previous	period,	and	a	target	
capital	stock	determined	by	expected	demand	and	an	assumed	capital-to-output	ratio.	A	proportion	
of	gross	profits	equal	to	the	depreciation	of	the	capital	stock	over	the	previous	period	is	assumed	to	
be	retained	by	firms	for	investment,	with	net	(additional)	investment	financed	through	a	mixture	of	
new	loans	from	banks	and	the	issuance	of	equities	to	households,	according	to	a	desired	debt-to-
equity	ratio.			
	
Government	receives	income	from	taxation	and	purchases	goods	and	services	(for	the	benefit	of	the	
public)	from	the	firms	sector.	Taxation	is	only	levied	on	households	in	this	version	of	the	model,	at	a	
rate	which	provides	for	an	initially	balanced	budget	under	the	default	values	for	aggregate	demand.		
	
Using	these	assumptions,	Jackson	and	Victor	(2015b)	explore	three	government	spending	scenarios:	
one	in	which	government	spending	remains	constant	throughout	the	run,	one	in	which	government	
spending	plus	bond	interest	is	equal	to	tax	receipts	(ie	a	strict	‘austerity’	policy	in	which	government	
balances	the	fiscal	budget),	and	one	in	which	government	engages	in	a	‘countercyclical’	spending	
																																								 																				
14		 In	the	full	FALSTAFF	framework,	household	savings	are	allocated	between	a	range	of	financial	assets	(and	
liabilities)	including	bank	deposits,	equities,	pension	funds,	government	bonds	(and	mortgage	and	loans),	using	
an	econometrically-estimated	portfolio	allocation	model	based	on	the	framework	originally	proposed	by	Brainard	
and	Tobin	(1968).		
15		 This	assumption	is	relaxed	in	the	full	FALSTAFF	model,	in	which	both	equity	prices	and	housing	vary	according	to	
supply	and	demand.		These	assets	are	therefore	subject	to	capital	gains	in	the	full	model.		
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policy,	increasing	spending	when	aggregate	demand	falls	and	decreasing	it	when	aggregate	demand	
rises.	Government	bonds	are	issued	to	cover	deficit	spending.		
	
Banks	accept	deposits	and	provide	loans	to	households	and	to	firms,	as	demanded.	Bank	profits	are	
generated	from	the	interest	rate	spread	between	deposits	and	loans,	plus	interest	paid	on	any	
government	bonds	they	hold.	Profits	are	distributed	to	households	as	dividends,	except	for	any	
retained	earnings	that	may	be	required	to	meet	the	capital	account	‘financing	requirement’.		This	
financing	requirement	is	the	difference	between	deposits	(inflows	into	the	capital	account)	and	the	
sum	of	loans,	bond	purchases	and	increases	in	central	bank	reserves	(outgoings	from	the	capital	
account).	The	central	bank	plays	a	very	simple	role	in	the	stationary	state	version	of	FALSTAFF,	
providing	liquidity	on	demand	(in	the	form	of	central	bank	reserves)	to	commercial	banks	in	
exchange	for	government	bonds.	
	
FALSTAFFS	provides	for	two	regulatory	policies	that	might	reasonably	be	imposed	on	banks.	First,	the	
model	can	impose	a	‘capital	adequacy’	requirement	in	which	banks	are	required	to	hold	enough	
‘capital’	to	cover	a	given	proportion	of	risky	assets.	Second,	banks	may	be	subject	to	a	central	bank	
‘reserve	ratio’	in	which	reserves	are	held	at	the	central	bank	up	to	a	given	proportion	of	deposits	
held	on	account.	Few	developed	countries	retain	formal	reserve	ratios	these	days,	leaving	it	up	to	
the	banks	themselves	to	decide	what	reserves	to	hold.	However,	we	have	included	a	default	reserve	
ratio	of	5%	in	order	to	test	Binswanger’s	hypothesis	that	such	requirements	might	lead	to	a	growth	
imperative.		
		
The	capital	adequacy	requirement	is	supposed	to	provide	resilience	in	the	face	of	defaulting	loans,	
as	required	for	instance	under	the	Basel	III	framework	(BIS	2011).	In	fact,	we	adopt	as	our	starting	
point	the	Basel	III	requirement	that	banks’	‘capital’	(the	book	value	of	equity	in	the	banks’	balance	
sheet)	should	be	equal	to	8%	of	risk-weighted	assets	(loans	to	households	and	firms).	To	meet	this	
requirement,	banks	in	FALSTAFFS	issue	equities	to	households,	which	has	the	effect	of	shifting	
deposits	to	equity	on	the	liability	side	of	the	balance	sheet	and	increasing	the	ratio	of	capital	to	
loans.	To	balance	the	balance	sheet,	banks	purchase	government	bonds	(conventionally	deemed	
risk-free)	which	together	with	central	bank	reserves	(also	risk-free)	provide	for	a	certain	proportion	
of	‘safe’	capital	to	balance	against	risky	assets.				
	
The	principal	aim	of	the	analysis	is	to	identify	the	potential	for	a	stationary	state	economy,	even	in	
the	presence	of	debt-based	money.	In	fact,	it	may	be	noted	that	the	FALSTAFF	economy	is	almost	
entirely	a	credit	money	economy.	No	physical	cash	changes	hands,	and	transactions	are	all	deemed	
to	be	electronic	transactions	through	the	bank	accounts	of	firms,	household	and	government	(and	
through	the	reserve	account	of	the	central	bank).	For	the	purposes	of	testing	the	role	of	credit	
creation	in	the	growth	imperative,	this	simplification	is	clearly	robust.	We	have	also	incorporated	
	
	
	
24	|	P a g e 	
	
	 	
	
conditions	on	commercial	banks	appropriate	for	the	testing	of	the	overall	hypothesis	that	interest-
bearing	debt	leads	to	growth.		
	
The	results	of	the	analysis	are	discussed	in	detail	in	Jackson	and	Victor	(2015b)	where	the	authors	
present	a	variety	of	scenarios,	the	first	of	these	demonstrates	clearly	the	potential	for	a	stationary	
state:	in	such	a	scenario	(which	was	tested	under	a	range	of	values	for	the	interest	rate	on	deposits,	
loans	and	government	bonds)	there	are	no	changes	in	any	of	the	real	economy	aggregates,	net	
lending	is	zero	across	all	sectors	and	there	are	no	changes	in	the	stocks	of	assets	and	liabilities.		
Though	not	particularly	representative	of	an	economy	in	the	real	world,	this	solution	does	however	
refute	the	‘growth	imperative’	hypothesis.			
	
Several	sensitivity	analyses	were	then	carried	out	to	test	the	robustness	of	this	finding.		First,	the	
authors	introduced	a	random	variation	in	consumer	demand	to	test	whether	the	stationary	state	
was	stable.			Figures	5	and	6	illustrate	the	results	of	this	analysis.	Although	Figure	5	shows	
considerable	variation	in	the	short	term	growth	rate	(within	a	range	of	less	than	±1%)	it	is	clear	that	
the	long-run	growth	rate	is	still	around	zero.	Certainly	there	is	no	obvious	systematic	expansion	of	
the	economy,	even	though	the	net	lending	positions	of	the	different	sectors	(Figure	6)	vary	
considerably	over	the	run.	Again,	variations	in	deposit,	loan,	and	bond	rates,	and	in	the	capital	
adequacy	requirement	and	the	reserve	ratio	make	no	appreciable	difference	to	this	long-term	trend,	
or	indeed	to	the	amplitude	of	the	variations	around	it.			
	
We	could	describe	the	economy	illustrated	in	Figures	5	and	6	as	a	quasi-stationary-state	economy	
with	a	long-run	average	growth	rate	of	zero.	Notice	that	the	sum	of	net	lending,	remains	zero	across	
the	run,	in	spite	of	the	variation	in	net	lending	in	individual	sectors.	This	is	an	indication	that	the	
model	is	working	consistently,	and	reflecting	correctly	the	accounting	identities	that	must	hold	in	
any	real	economy.	Though	the	pattern	looks	rather	dramatic,	notice	that	the	amplitude	of	the	
variations	in	net	lending	is	not	high	–	less	than	0.5%	of	the	GDP	in	most	cases.				
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Figure	5:	Growth	rate	under	random	fluctuations	in	consumer	demand	(Scenario	2)	
	
	
Figure	6:	Net	lending	under	random	fluctuations	in	consumer	demand	(Scenario	2)	
	
Next,	the	authors	tested	the	stability	of	the	economy	following	a	larger	one-off	shock	to	consumer	
demand.		Once	again,	(Figure	7,	Scenario	3),	the	stationary	state	was	stable,	in	the	sense	that	the	
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growth	rate	returned	to	zero	over	the	long	term,	despite	initial	fluctuations	in	demand.	Jackson	and	
Victor	(2015b)	also	tested	two	potential	kinds	of	responses	in	the	face	of	such	a	consumption	shock.		
The	first	was	the	response	of	government;	the	second	was	the	response	of	investors	(firms).			
	
In	the	face	of	a	decline	in	aggregate	demand,	governments	tend	to	have	lower	tax	receipts	and	
potentially	higher	welfare	costs,	leading	to	a	rising	fiscal	deficit	with	potentially	higher	borrowing	
costs	in	the	future.		It	is	therefore	not	unusual	for	governments	to	respond	to	lower	aggregate	
demand	by	reducing	government	spending.		Austerity	policy	(as	it	has	come	to	be	called)	was	one	of	
the	principal	responses	to	the	financial	crisis	of	2008/9	by	western	governments.		Paradoxically	
however,	this	response	can	significantly	slow	down	recovery	and	as	Jackson	and	Victor	(2015:	
Scenario	4)	in	the	extreme	case	it	can	lead	to	a	complete	collapse	in	aggregate	demand.		Keynesians	
have	long	argued	that	the	appropriate	response	of	government	in	the	face	of	declining	aggregate	
demand	is	to	increase	government	spending.		FALSTAFFS	can	be	used	to	model	the	implications	of	
this	kind	of	‘counter-cyclical’	spending.		
	
A	similar	choice	faces	investors.		When	expected	output	falls,	the	tendency	is	to	reduce	investment,	
this	reduction	in	investment	depresses	output	further.		However,	it	also	acts	to	increase	the	rate	of	
return	on	capital	and	hence	to	improve	profitability.		Conversely,	when	expected	output	rises,	there	
is	a	tendency	to	overinvest	and	this	reduces	the	return	on	capital	and	the	profitability	of	firms.	The	
outcome	of	these	combined	processes	is	a	business	cycle,	in	which	investment	(and	output)	typically	
follow	a	pattern	of	waves	whose	amplitude	depends	on	the	strength	of	the	response	(the	animal	
spirits)	of	investors	to	expected	changes	in	final	demand.		FALSTAFFS	can	simulate	a	change	in	animal	
spirits	–	the	strength	of	the	investor	response	to	changes	in	expected	demand	–	and	hence	explore	
the	implications	of	different	behaviour	responses	to	a	one-off	shock.				
	
Figure	7	shows	three	scenarios	taken	from	Jackson	and	Victor	(2015b).		Scenario	3	illustrates	
changes	in	the	growth	rate	following	a	one-off	shock	with	default	government	response	(no	change	
in	spending)	and	default	investor	response	(no	amplification	of	the	accelerator	coefficient	in	the	
investment	function).		Scenario	5	shows	how	the	amplitude	of	the	after-shocks	increases	when	there	
is	an	increase	in	animal	spirits	from	investors.	In	fact,	this	scenario	becomes	unstable	in	the	long	run.		
Scenario	6	shows	how	these	fluctuations	can	be	tamed	by	a	countercyclical	spending	strategy	in	
which	government	spending	is	increased	when	demand	growth	falls	below	zero	and	decreases	when	
demand	growth	rises	above	zero.		Scenario	4	(not	shown	here)	is	the	collapse	scenario,	in	which	
government	imposes	strict	austerity.					
	
	
	
27	|	P a g e 	
	
	 	
	
	
Figure	7:	The	stabilising	influence	of	countercyclical	spending		
after	a	demand	shock	with	increased	‘animal	spirits’		
	
In	summary,	Jackson	and	Victor	(2015b)	had	developed	a	variety	of	scenarios	which	exemplify	quasi-
stationary	states	of	various	kinds,	and	which	offered	resilience	from	instability	in	the	face	of	random	
fluctuations,	demand	shocks,	and	exaggerated	‘animal	spirits’.	None	of	the	scenarios	were	sensitive	
to	modest	changes	in	the	values	for	interest	rates		on	deposits,	loans	and	government	bonds.16		
	
Perhaps	most	significantly,	these	conclusions	are	not	changed	by	imposing	demands	on	banks	to	
maintain	a	given	capital	adequacy	ratio	or	to	hold	a	given	ratio	of	central	bank	reserves	to	bank	
deposits.		The	only	scenario	in	which	instability	led	to	economic	collapse	was	the	one	in	which	we	
imposed	a	‘strict’	austerity	policy	in	response	to	a	negative	shock	to	consumer	demand.	In	this	case,	
it	was	the	austerity	policy,	rather	than	the	existence	of	debt,	that	crashed	the	model.	
	
It	is	worth	pointing	out	that,	in	spite	of	the	findings	here,	there	are	a	number	of	good	arguments	
against	private	interest-bearing	debt	as	the	main	means	of	creation	(and	destruction)	of	the	money	
supply.	As	a	wide	variety	of	authors	have	pointed	out,17	this	form	of	money	can	lead	to	
																																								 																				
16		 A	sensitivity	analysis	was	conducted	in	FALSTAFF	for	values	of	the	interest	rate	on	loans	between	0	and	15%,	and	
on	bonds	and	deposits	between	0	and	10%.	Slight	increases	in	the	amplitude	of	oscillations	was	observed	at	
higher	interest	rates,	under	conditions	of	shock.	But	the	conclusions	observed	in	this	paper	still	held.					
17		 Useful	critiques	of	debt-based	money	can	be	found	in	Sigurjónsson	2015,	Daly	2014,	Wolf	2014,	Farley	et	al	2013,	
Jackson	and	Dyson	2012,	Huber	and	Robertson	2000,	as	well	as	the	ground-breaking,	early	work	from	Douthwaite	
(1990).	The	idea	of	eliminating	banks’	ability	to	create	money	can	be	traced	to	Frederick	Soddy	(1931);	for	a	
useful	historical	overview	see	Dittmer	2015.		
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unsustainable	levels	of	public	and	private	debt,	increased	price	and	fiscal	instability,	speculative	
behaviour	in	relation	to	environmental	resources,	greater	inequality	in	incomes	and	in	wealth,	and	a	
loss	of	sovereign	control	of	the	money	system.	We	are	therefore	firmly	of	the	opinion	that	monetary	
reform	is	an	essential	component	of	a	sustainable	economy.	We	regard	the	current	study	as	an	
important	way	of	distinguishing	where	effort	should	be	placed	in	transforming	this	system.	
Specifically,	the	results	in	this	paper	suggest	that	it	is	not	necessary	to	eliminate	interest-bearing	
debt	per	se,	if	the	goal	is	to	achieve	a	resilient,	stationary	or	quasi-stationary	state	of	the	economy.		
	
It	is	also	worth	reiterating	that,	aside	from	the	question	of	interest-bearing	money,	there	exists	a	
number	of	other	incentives	towards	growth	within	the	architecture	of	the	capitalist	economy.	We	
have	elucidated	some	of	these	incentives	elsewhere	(Jackson	2009,	Victor	2008,	Jackson	and	Victor	
2011).	They	must	be	taken	to	include,	for	instance:	profit	maximisation	(and	in	particular	the	pursuit	
of	labour	productivity	growth)	by	firms,	asset	price	speculation	and	consumer	aspirations	for	
increased	income	and	wealth.	Some	of	these	mechanisms	also	lead	to	potential	instabilities	in	the	
capitalist	economy.	Many	of	them	are	reliant	on	the	existence	of	credit-based	money	systems.	
Minsky	(1994),	perhaps	most	famously,	has	shown	how	cycles	of	investment	and	speculation,	built	
around	debt-based	money,	can	lead	to	endemic	instability.	But	this	logic	does	not	entail	that	
interest-bearing	money,	in	and	of	itself,	creates	a	growth	imperative.		
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6	 FALSTAFF	Part	2:	Green	Investment	and	Portfolio	Allocation	
In	addition	to	the	work	described	in	Section	5,	the	FALSTAFF	framework	has	been	used	to	illustrate	
the	importance	of	assessing	both	real	and	financial	aspects	of	the	transition	to	a	low-carbon	
economy.		Illustrative	results	from	an	expanded	version	of	the	model	were	presented	at	a	workshop	
convened	by	the	UNEP	Finance	Initiative	in	Waterloo,	Canada	in	December	2014	(Jackson	and	Victor	
2015c).	The	Waterloo	version	of	FALSTAFF	–	denoted	here	as	FALSTAFFW	for	ease	of	reference	-		
included	several	additions	and	variations	to	the	model	described	in	the	previous	section.	These	
comprised:	an	econometrically	estimated	investment	function,	an	econometrically	estimated	
portfolio	allocation	model	to	describe	households	savings	behaviour,	an	additional	sector	to	account	
for		trade	(and	capital	transactions)	with	the	rest	of	the	world,	and	an	expanded	balance	sheet	
including	debt,	equity,	bonds,	housing,	mortgages,	loans	and	pension	funds.			
	
In	this	section	we	provide	an	overview	of	the	structure	of	the	expanded	FALSTAFFW	model	and	
present	some	of	the	illustrative	results	presented	at	the	Waterloo	meeting.			
	
Households	make	three	kinds	of	decisions	in	FALSTAFFW.	First	they	decide	how	much	to	spend	and	
how	much	to	save.	Second,	they	decide	how	much	to	invest	in	fixed	capital	assets	(housing).	Finally	
they	decide	how	to	allocate	savings/borrowing	to	different	asset	classes.	In	relation	to	the	first	
decision,	the	model	allows	the	user	to	choose	between	a	simple	savings	ratio	based	on	a	proportion	
of	disposable	income,	or	a	more	sophisticated	consumption	function	of	the	form	favoured	by	post-
Keynesian	SFC	theorists,	in	which	household	consumption	C	is	given	by	a	function	of	the	form:		
	
	 	 	 	 𝐶 =  𝛼!𝑌!"#$  +  𝛼!𝑁𝑊! 	 	 	 5)	
	
where	Ydisp	is	the	disposable	income	of	households	and	NWh	is	their	net	worth.	This	form	of	
consumption	function	thus	incorporates	both	propensities	to	consume	from	disposable	income	and	
also	propensities	to	consume	from	household	wealth	(as	does	the	model	in	Section	5).	In	the	long	
run	this	dependency	of	consumption	on	household	wealth	provides	a	link	between	behaviour	in	the	
real	economy	and	the	health	of	the	financial	economy	(Godley	and	Lavoie,	2007),	although	it	should	
be	noted	that	these	feedbacks	are	much	slower	than	those	provided	via	stock-market	signals	on	
consumer	confidence,	for	instance.	Values	for	α1	and	α2	were	estimated	using	quarterly	national	
accounts	data	between	1991	and	2013,	published	by	for	Canada	by	Statistics	Canada	and	for	the	UK	
by	the	Office	for	National	Statistics.18		
	
																																								 																				
18		 The	StatCan	database	(http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/)	is	one	of	the	most	user-friendly	national	accounts	
databases	of	any	country	in	the	world	and	one	of	the	reasons	we	decided	to	calibrate	FALSTAFF	first	against	
Canadian	data.		
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Housing	investment	in	FALSTAFFW	is	driven	partly	by	population	growth,19	and	partly	by	an	
exogenously	defined	housing	growth	parameter	to	reflect	changes	in	household	size	and	
composition.			The	price	of	housing	is	determined	by	the	balance	between	supply	of	housing	
(investment)	and	the	desire	for	housing,	which	flows	from	households	savings	decision.		
These	savings	decisions	are	a	key	element	in	the	establishment	of	SFC	monetary	flows	and	are	
modelled	in	FALSTAFFW	using	an	econometrically	estimated	Portfolio	Allocation	Module	based	on	a	
framework	originally	developed	by	Brainard	and	Tobin	(1968)	–	part	of	the	work	for	which	Tobin	
later	received	a	Nobel	prize.	The	approach	was	later	adopted	(and	adapted)	by	Godley	and	Lavoie	
(2007)	as	a	key	element	within	a	post-Keynesian	SFC	approach.		
	
The	broad	thrust	of	the	approach	is	to	suppose	that	the	desired	holdings	of	a	particular	asset	depend	
both	on	the	rate	of	return	on	that	asset	and	also	on	the	rates	of	return	(or	interest	rates)	on	other	
assets	(or	liabilities).	So	for	example,	if	the	rate	of	return	on	equities	rises	(or	is	expected	to	rise),	
households	tend	to	allocate	more	of	their	savings	to	equities	than,	say,	government	bonds.	
Conversely	if	the	return	on	equity	falls	(or	is	expected	to	fall),	households	would	tend	to	sell	equities	
in	favour	of	some	other	asset.	There	are	several	distinct	ways	of	representing	this	kind	of	allocation	
process.	For	example,	one	can	proceed	(see	Godley	and	Lavoie,	2007)	by	determining	for	each	asset	
Ai	a	target	proportion	of	household	net	worth,	𝑎!!,	occupied	by	that	asset,	given	by:		
	 𝑎!! = 𝜆!! + 𝜆!"𝑟!! +  𝜆!!! !!!"	 	 	 	 6)	
	
where	the	rj	are	the	rates	of	return	(or	interest)	on	the	various	assets	(or	liabilities)	and	the	λij	are	
constant	coefficients,	to	be	derived	from	a	(constrained)	econometric	analysis	of	past	trends.20			
In	this	version	of	FALSTAFF,	we	estimate	these	target	proportions	using	data	for	seven	distinct	
asset/liability	classes:	deposits,	bonds,	equities,	housing	wealth,	mortgages,	loans	and	pensions.		
	
When	we	estimated	these	relationships	using	the	econometric	software	Eviews	and	quarterly	
financial	accounts	data	for	Canada	and	the	UK	from	1991	to	2013,	we	found	a	high	degree	of	
dependency	on	𝑎!!(−1),	the	first	lag	of	𝑎!!.	In	other	words,	it	seems	as	though	households’	portfolio	
allocations	are	relatively	“sticky”	on	aggregate.	To	improve	the	estimation	we	made	two	changes	to	
equation	6).	The	first	was	to	use	Yd	directly	rather	than	the	ratio	Yd/NW	as	a	dependent	variable	on	
the	right	hand	side	of	the	equation.	The	second	was	to	include	the	lagged	variable	𝑎!(−1)	–	the	
actual	value	of	asset	Ai	as	a	proportion	of	net	worth	in	the	previous	period	–	as	an	additional	
																																								 																				
19	We	assume	an	exogenously	variable	0.5%	annual	growth	rate	for	population.		
20	In	order	for	this	procedure	to	work	correctly,	it	should	be	noted	that	liabilities	(mortgages	and	loans)	must	be	counted	in	a	
negative	sense	within	the	framework.	
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dependent	variable	on	the	right	hand	side	of	the	equation.21	The	econometric	estimation	of	the	
target	proportion	for	each	asset	and	liability	in	FALSTAFFW	is	therefore	given	by:		
	
	 	 	 𝑎!! = 𝜆!! + 𝜆!"𝑟!! +  𝜆!!!𝑌! +  𝜆!!!𝑎!(−1)	 	 7)	
	
The	model	in	this	form	was	reasonably	successful	in	replicating	historical	trends	in	the	holdings	of	
different	asset	types.	Figure	8	illustrates	for	example	the	estimated	and	actual	holdings	of	equities	
by	households	in	Canada	between	1991	and	2013.	In	particular	it	is	to	be	noted	that	the	model	
successfully	predicts	both	the	impact	of	the	financial	crisis	on	equity	holdings	and	also	the	
subsequent	recovery	as	well	as	the	results	of	the	earlier	dot.com	bubble	and	subsequent	market	fall.	
This	is	an	important	validation	of	the	model’s	ability	to	reflect	financial	stability	and	instability	–	a	
core	goal	of	our	approach.		
	
	
Figure	8:	Estimated	and	actual	holdings	of	equities	by	Canadian	households,	1991-2013	
Source:	output	from	the	Portfolio	Allocation	Module	in	FALSTAFFW.	
	
The	firms	sector	in	FALSTAFFW	simulates	the	production	of	all	goods	and	services	in	the	economy,	
including	those	accounted	for	by	public	spending.22	Nominal	demand	in	the	economy	represents	
firms’	income.	The	labour	employment	LE	required	to	meet	this	demand	is	calculated	using	a	time-
																																								 																				
21		 This	is	similar	but	a	little	less	constrained	than	estimating	the	differenced	variable	𝛥𝑎!!on	the	left	hand	side	of	6).		
22		 Though	something	of	a	simplification	of	the	structure	of	a	real	economy,	this	is	also	the	way	in	which	public	
spending	is	accounted	for	in	the	national	accounts.		
	
	
	
32	|	P a g e 	
	
	 	
	
varying	labour	productivity	function	LP	which	varies	over	time	according	to	an	econometrically	
estimated	real	labour	productivity	growth	rate,	lpg	according	to:	
	
	 	 	 	 𝐿𝑃 =  𝐿𝑃!(1 + 𝑙𝑝𝑔)!!!"#! 	 	 	 8a)	
	 	 	 	 𝐿𝐸 =  !"#!"#!.!" 	 	 	 	 	 8b)	
	
where	p	is	price	and	GDPnom	is	the	nominal	demand.	It	should	be	clear	that	nominal	demand	cannot	
always	be	met	by	domestic	production,	particularly	given	that	labour	is	constrained	by	the	available	
labour	force	which	therefore	determines	a	supply	constraint	on	the	domestic	economy.		
	
Firms’	costs	include	taxes	on	production	and	on	products	(determined	in	the	government	sector),	
interest	payments	on	loans,	and	wages.	The	wage	bill	is	calculated	via	a	time-varying	wage	rate	WR	
which	also	determines	price	in	the	model.	Two	factors	are	deemed	to	change	the	wage	rate	in	the	
model.	Initially	we	assume	that	labour	productivity	improvements	are	passed	on	to	workers,	so	that	
the	unadjusted	wage	rate	WR	is	given	by:		
	 𝑊𝑅 =  𝑊𝑅!(1 + 𝑙𝑝𝑔)!!!"#!	 	 	 9)	
	
An	inflation	adjusted	wage	rate	WR’	is	then	estimated	by	using	a	simplified	Phillips	curve	that	
inflates	the	wage	rate	when	unemployment	is	low	and	deflates	it	when	unemployment	is	high.23	The	
price	of	domestically	produced	goods	in	the	model	is	determined	by	the	ratio	of	the	inflation	
adjusted	wage	rate	WR’	to	the	unadjusted	wage	rate	WR.		
	
Firms	have	to	make	three	other	kinds	of	decisions	in	FALSTAFFW:	how	much	of	their	net	profits	F	to	
distribute	as	dividends;	how	much	to	invest	in	production;	and	how	to	finance	this	investment.	The	
dividend	distribution	FD	can	be	decided	either	via	an	exogenously	determined	“retained	earnings	
ratio”	or	else	through	an	equation	of	the	form:	
		 𝐹! =  𝐹! −1 +  𝜂𝐹(−1)	 	 	 10)	
	
where	F(-1)	denotes	profits	in	the	previous	period	(i.e.	the	first	lag	of	profits)	and	η	is	an	
econometrically	estimated	coefficient.		
The	investment	decision	is	determined	in	two	parts.	One	of	our	intentions	in	the	model	is	to	be	able	
to	understand	the	implications	of	green	investment	on	the	performance	of	the	economy.	We	
therefore	separate	firms’	investment	into	a	conventional	component,	predicted	econometrically	in	
																																								 																				
23		 Our	Phillips	curve	is	similar	to	the	one	used	by	Keen	(2011)	with	a	flat	section	around	normal	employment	rates,	a	
rising	adjustment	for	low	unemployment,	a	declining	(but	flatter)	line	for	medium	unemployment	and	a	flat	
downwards	adjustment	of	the	wage	for	high	unemployment.		
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the	model	and	a	green	component	which	is	determined	exogenously.	For	the	conventional	
component,	we	use	an	investment	function	proposed	by	Lavoie	and	Godley	(2001).	Firms’	
investment	I	is	estimated	with	a	capital	accumulation	rate	g	which	is	deemed	to	be	dependent	on	
the	rate	of	cash	flow	rcf	(calculated	from	the	ratio	of	retained	earnings	to	capital),	the	rate	of	interest	
rLf	on	firms	loans	(moderated	by	a	leverage	ratio,	l),	Tobin’s	q	ratio24	and	the	rate	rCU	of	capacity	
utilisation:		
	 	 	 𝑔 =  𝛾!𝑟!" + 𝛾!𝑟!"𝑙 + 𝛾!𝑞 + 𝛾!𝑟!"	 	 	 11)	
	
Broadly	speaking,	this	function	means	that	conventional	investment	is	expected	to	increase	with	
increasing	cash	flow,	to	decline	with	increasing	interest	rates,	to	rise	as	Tobin’s	q	rises	(because	the	
value	of	equity	is	high	in	relation	to	capital),	and	to	increase	with	the	capacity	utilisation	rate.	This	
last	factor	reflects	the	impact	of	rising	demand	on	investment.	As	demand	rises,	spare	capacity	
diminishes,	encouraging	new	investment.	Conventional	investment	is	then	given	by:		
	
		 	 	 	 𝐼 = 𝑔𝐾!(−1)	 	 	 	 	 11)	
	
Where	Kf(-1)	is	the	lag	of	firms’	productive	capital	stock	Kf.		
	
Although	the	investment	in	productive	capital	stock	is	endogenous	in	FALSTAFFW,	green	investment	
is	determined	exogenously.	It	is	assumed	first	that	over	the	course	of	the	run,	a	rising	proportion	of	
GDP	(starting	from	zero)	will	be	allocated	to	green	investment.	The	user	decides	on	the	final	target	
proportion	and	also	selects	the	sectors	in	which	this	investment	is	made	(firms,	housing,	
government).	The	model	then	calculates	the	green	investment	in	each	sector	over	each	year	of	the	
run	assuming	the	same	proportions	of	green	investment	in	each	sector	as	predicted	for	conventional	
investment.	The	impact	on	the	economy	of	this	green	investment	depends	on	two	further	
parameters.	The	first	is	the	extent	to	which	it	is	deemed	to	be	additional	to	or	simply	to	substitute	
for	predicted	investment.	The	second	is	the	extent	to	which	both	additional	and	nonadditional	green	
investments	are	productive	–	in	the	sense	that	they	add	to	the	productive	stock	of	the	economy.25	
Both	of	these	parameters	can	be	selected	by	the	user.	The	default	position	assumes	that	green	
investments	will	be	non-additional,	so	that	there	will	be	a	gradual	shift	away	from	“brown	
investment”	towards	green	investment	within	the	same	investment	architecture	predicted	by	the	
model.	It	should	be	noted	that	productive	additional	investment	adds	to	the	productive	capacity	of	
the	economy,	whereas	non-productive,	non-additional	investments	subtract	from	the	productive	
capacity	of	the	economy.	Non-productive,	additional	investments	add	to	nominal	demand	in	the	
																																								 																				
24		 Tobin’s	q	(first	proposed	by	Nobel	Laureate	James	Tobin)	is	a	parameter	that	measures	the	ratio	of	the	value	of	
equity	to	the	value	of	the	capital	stock.	
25		 We	use	the	term	“productive”	here	in	the	rather	conventional	sense	that	an	increase	in	the	productive	capital	
stock	increases	the	immediate	capacity	of	the	economy	to	produce	goods	and	services.	Clearly,	this	does	not	
always	coincide	with	the	long-term	sustainability	of	that	production,	which	might	be	better	protected	by	the	so-
called	“non-productive”	investments	designed	to	protect	environmental	resources.		
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economy,	but	do	not	change	the	productive	capital	stock.	The	model	accounts	separately	for	non-
productive	capital	stocks.		
	
The	financial	and	monetary	importance	of	this	distinction	concerns	the	supply	constraints	on	
domestic	production	of	goods	and	services.	Just	as	supply	is	sometimes	constrained	by	available	
labour,	it	may	also	be	constrained	by	available	capital.	We	assume	here	a	constant	capital	output	
ratio	(calibrated	against	historical	data)	to	determine	a	further	limit	on	maximum	real	(and	hence	
nominal)	demand	supplied	by	the	domestic	economy.	The	overall	limit	on	GDP	is	then	the	minimum	
of	the	maxima	determined	through	labour	and	through	capital	constraints.		Once	supply	constraints	
are	reached,	additional	nominal	demand	created	by	the	exogenous	investment	strategy	can	only	be	
met	in	two	ways:	first	by	increasing	imported	final	demand	from	the	overseas	sector;	or	in	the	
absence	of	this	possibility	by	an	increase	in	prices.		Both	avenues	would	tend	to	depress	real	GDP	
growth.				
	
The	final	decision	to	be	made	by	firms	is	how	to	finance	the	overall	investment	needs	(including	both	
conventional	and	green	investments).	In	FALSTAFF,	firms	investments	can	be	funded	through	
retained	earnings	(profits	minus	dividends),	through	issuing	new	equities	and	through	taking	out	
new	bank	loans.	Once	firms’	retained	earnings	are	exhausted	we	assume	that	additional	financing	
needs	are	met	through	a	mixture	of	loans	and	equities	according	to	an	exogenously	variable	debt	to	
equity	ratio,	which	is	moderated	to	some	(variable)	degree	by	the	rate	of	interest	on	firms’	loans.26		
	
The	banks	sector	in	FALSTAFF	is	a	simplified	accounting	sector	with	two	main	functions.	Its	profit	and	
loss	account	simply	collates	the	interest	payments	on	loans	(including	household	mortgages)	and	
pays	out	the	interest	due	on	deposits.	Gross	profits	are	the	difference	between	these	two.27	Banks	
pay	taxes	to	the	government	on	these	earnings	and	net	profits	are	divided	between	retained	
earnings	and	dividends.	Banks’	dividends	are	calculated	as	a	residual.	Retained	earnings	decisions	
depend	on	the	financing	requirements	of	banks,	which	are	in	their	turn	depend	on	what	is	
happening	in	the	capital	account.	This	is	the	second	function	allocated	to	banks	in	FALSTAFF	and	
relates	to	the	provision	of	capital	facilities	(deposits	and	loans)	for	other	sectors.		
	
There	are	two	main	capital	account	decisions	to	be	made	by	banks.	The	first	is	how	much	money	to	
hold	as	reserves	with	the	central	bank.	For	the	purposes	of	this	version	of	the	model,	this	is	allocated	
through	an	exogenously	variable	reserve	ratio,	with	a	default	value	in	which	reserves	constitute	1%	
of	deposits	held	with	the	bank.	The	second	decision	involves	banks	capital	adequacy	requirements.	
																																								 																				
26		 Currently	this	moderation	of	the	debt	to	equity	ratio	is	determined	by	a	small	exogenously	set	adjustment	to	the	
debt	to	equity	preference.	In	future	developments	we	will	look	for	ways	to	endogenize	the	debt	to	equity	ratio	
further	to	depend	on	market	conditions.		
27		 We	do	not,	for	instance,	include	banks	wages	in	the	banking	sector.	They	are	assumed	to	be	accounted	for	via	the	
firms	sector.		
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Basel	III	requires	banks	to	hold	a	minimum	of	8%	of	their	risk-adjusted	capital	in	the	form	of	risk-free	
capital.	We	interpret	this	requirement	to	mean	that	the	sum	of	banks	reserves	plus	their	holdings	of	
sovereign	bonds	must	be	8%	of	their	total	private	sector	lending.28	This	capital	adequacy	
requirement	then	determines	banks	need	for	government	bonds,	and	also	(in	conjunction	with	the	
changes	in	deposits	and	lending)	determines	their	need	for	retained	earnings.	Specifically,	the	
transaction	matrix	reveals	that	banks’	undistributed	profits	FUf	are	given	by:	
	 𝐹𝑈! =  𝛥𝐷 + 𝛥𝑃 − 𝛥𝐿 − 𝛥𝑀 − 𝛥𝑅 − 𝛥𝐵		 	 	 12)	
	
Where	D	represents	deposits,	P	is	pensions,	L	is	loans	to	households	and	firms,	M	is	mortgages	
against	property	purchases,	R	is	central	bank	reserves	and	B	is	government	bonds.	In	the	event	that	
this	funding	requirement	exceeds	total	net	profits,	banks	can	also	meet	their	funding	requirement	
by	taking	out	loans	(advances)	from	the	central	bank.		
	
The	government	sector	in	FALSTAFFW	allows	for	a	variety	of	government	spending	strategies	and	sets	
the	tax	rates	on	household	income,	firms’	income	and	(indirectly)	on	products.	Spending	decisions	
by	the	government	can	be	determined	in	three	separate	Modes	in	the	model.	In	Mode	1,	a	simple	
exogenously	varied	growth	rate	is	applied	to	both	consumption	spending	and	investment	spending.	
The	default	value	in	the	base	run	(described	in	more	detail	in	the	next	section)	is	2%	per	annum.	In	
Mode	2,	the	government	can	operate	a	balanced	budget	policy	in	which	spending	is	strictly	
constrained	by	tax	receipts.	Finally,	in	Mode	3,	it	can	operate	a	counter-cyclical	adjustment	to	the	
exogenous	growth	rate	in	which	government	spending	rises	(by	up	to	20%)	if	unemployment	is	high	
and	falls	(by	up	to	the	same	amount)	when	unemployment	is	low.	In	each	of	these	modes,	it	is	also	
assumed	that	governments	will	tend	to	reduce	deficits	(or	surpluses)	through	adjustments	to	both	
spending	and	the	tax	rates,	when	the	debt	to	GDP	ratio	rises	above	(or	falls	below)	certain	levels.	
		
Government	borrowing	is	funded	through	the	issuance	of	bonds	which	are	conceptualised	in	
FALSTAFFW	as	simple	loans	with	an	endogenously	varying	interest	rate.	Three	other	sectors	create	an	
endogenous	demand	for	loans.	Households	purchase	bonds	in	response	to	their	asset	allocation	
preferences	(equation	4)	above).	Banks	hold	bonds	in	order	to	meet	their	capital	adequacy	
requirements.	Central	banks	hold	bonds	(see	below)	in	exchange	for	liquidity	provided	to	
commercial	banks	in	the	form	of	reserves.	The	gap	between	the	supply	of	bonds	(government	
borrowing)	and	the	demand	for	bonds	is	assumed	to	be	met	by	bond	purchases/sales	from	the	
foreign	sector.29		
	
																																								 																				
28		 Sovereign	bonds	are	typically	rated	at	zero	risk.	The	historical	data	support	a	close	to	8%	capital	adequacy	ratio	in	
Canada.	This	rate	can	be	varied	in	the	model.		
29		 A	more	sophisticated	endogenization	of	the	price	of	bonds	through	capital	gains/losses	(ie	changes	in	bond	yields)	
is	under	development.		
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The	central	bank	sets	interest	rates	in	FALSTAFFW,	by	lowering	the	base	rate30	when	unemployment	
is	high	and	raising	it	when	unemployment	is	low.	Rates	on	other	assets	or	liabilities	(deposits,	
household	loans,	mortgages	on	property,	firms’	loans,	central	bank	advances	and	reserves)	are	set	
by	historically	calibrated	interest	rate	spreads	around	the	base	rate.31	Aside	from	this	monetary	
policy	function,	the	central	bank’s	only	other	interactions	are	with	the	commercial	bank	sector,	
providing	additional	liquidity	for	the	commercial	banks	by	exchanging	government	bonds	for	central	
bank	reserves	and	providing	a	lender	of	last	resort	function	through	advances	when	required.		
	
In	contrast	to	the	closed	economies	described	in	Sections	4	and	5,	FALSTAFFW	introduces	a	foreign	
sector	to	account	for	the	balance	of	trade	between	the	domestic	economy	and	the	rest	of	the	world.	
The	import	sector	can	be	configured	in	two	different	ways.	In	the	“balanced	trade”	mode	the	
economy	is	assumed	to	aim	in	the	short	term	for	a	balanced	trade	position	in	which	imports	are	
more	or	less	equal	to	exports.	In	the	second	mode,	the	trade	position	can	float,	allowing	the	
overseas	sector	to	supply	the	balance	between	nominal	domestic	demand	and	the	(capital	and	
labour	constrained)	capacity	of	the	domestic	economy.	This	supply	balance	includes	provision	for	a	
given	target	unemployment	rate.	Once	unemployment	in	the	domestic	economy	meets	this	target,	it	
is	assumed	that	additional	supply	capacity	is	provided	by	the	overseas	sector.	This	device	is	
somewhat	simplistic	but	serves	for	the	moment	both	to	maintain	the	supply	demand	balance	in	the	
model	and	also	to	stabilise	the	unemployment	rate.		
	
Aside	from	the	nominal	net	import	balance,	the	current	account	of	the	foreign	sector	includes	only	
interest	receipts	(from	bonds	and	deposits)	and	interest	payments	(for	loans).	The	net	lending	of	the	
overseas	sector	is	then	allocated	in	two	separate	ways,	through	bonds	purchased	from	or	sold	back	
to	the	domestic	economy	government,	and	loans	taken	out	from	or	deposits	paid	into	domestic	
economy	banks.	Bond	purchases	are	assumed	to	take	up	the	slack	between	the	domestic	demand	
for	bonds	and	the	borrowing	requirement	of	the	domestic	government.	The	remaining	transactions	
(in	either	loans	or	deposits)	are	determined	by	the	accounting	requirement	of	the	transaction	flows	
matrix.	In	other	words,	any	bond	purchases	must	be	paid	for	either	from	the	net	lending	of	the	
foreign	current	account	sector	or	from	loans	taking	out	from	domestic	sector	banks.	
	
Finally,	FALSTAFFW	incorporates	an	environmental	burden	sector	which	uses	simple	intensity	
coefficients	and	reduction	targets	to	model	the	impact	of	exogenously	determined	investment	
strategies.	Green	investment	(see	above)	acts	to	reduce	the	environmental	burden	index	(EBI)	which	
measures	the	overall	environmental	burden	of	the	economy.		The	EBI	was	loosely	calibrated	to	
respond	to	the	investment	needs	associated	with	meeting	aggressive	domestic	greenhouse	gas	
reduction	targets.		
																																								 																				
30		 The	rate	at	which	commercial	banks	can	borrow	from	the	central	bank.		
31		 It	is	also	possible	to	“turn	off”	the	endogenously	calculated	interest	rates	in	FALSTAFF.	In	this	mode,	the	model	
simply	uses	the	historical	base	year	data.		
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The	broad	aim	of	the	FALSTAFFW	was	to	illustrate	the	need	to	integrate	financial	and	monetary	
understanding	into	any	exploration	of	the	potential	for	green	or	sustainable	investment.	Financing	
the	transition	to	a	low	carbon	economy,	for	instance,	cannot	simply	be	a	question	of	quantifying	an	
investment	need	and	then	assuming	that	this	quantum	has	no	appreciable	impact	on	financial	or	
monetary	stability.	A	core	element	within	the	work	was	therefore	to	demonstrate	the	capability	of	
SFC	modelling	to	inform	questions	about	the	structure	(and	long-term	viability)	of	sustainable	
investment.		Three,	highly	illustrative	scenarios	were	discussed	at	the	Waterloo	meeting.			
	
• A	“Base	Run”	scenario	assumed	growth	in	government	spending	at	a	rate	approximately	
equal	to	the	desired	growth	rate,	a	liberal	position	in	relation	to	overseas	trade	which	did	
not	seek	to	constrain	the	balance	of	payments,	and	investment	driven	only	by	the	
econometric	investment	function,	with	no	specific	role	for	green	investment;	
• A	“Balanced	Trade”	scenario	assumed	the	same	parameters	as	the	BAU	usual	scenario	but	
sought	in	addition	to	achieve	a	position	in	which	exports	and	imports	were	balanced;	
• A	“Green	Transformation”	scenario	sought	to	explore	the	implications	of	very	substantial	
increases	in	green	investment	over	the	lifetime	of	the	scenario	while	allowing	for	a	balanced	
trade	position	to	be	achieved;	in	support	of	these	aims	the	Green	Transformation	scenario	
allowed	for	a	policy	of	countercyclical	spending	by	the	government;	and	a	shift	to	services,	
characterised	as	decline	in	labour	productivity	growth	over	the	run.		
	
Not	surprisingly,	since	it	is	the	only	scenario	with	substantive	green	investment,	only	the	Green	
Transformation	showed	a	decline	in	the	Environmental	Burden	Index	(Figure	18	in	Jackson	and	Victor	
2015c).	More	interesting	were	a	variety	of	indications	in	relation	to	monetary	and	financial	aspects	
of	the	economy	from	the	three	scenarios.		Amongst	a	number	of	tentative	findings	were	the	
following:		
	
• Although	the	Base	Run	achieved	a	consistent	growth	path	over	the	scenario	period,	it	did	so	
at	the	expense	of	several	undesirable	features	of	the	financial	economy,	including:	a	rising	
debt	to	GDP	ratio;	an	increasing	fragile	position	in	relation	to	the	household	sector	balance	
sheet,	including	the	near	collapse	of	pension	provisions	by	the	end	of	the	run	and	an	
extended	asset	bubble	in	the	housing	market,	with	highly	leveraged	positions	in	the	
mortgage	market;	and	a	rising	balance	of	payments	deficit	over	the	later	years	of	the	
scenario	(cf	Figures	4-8	in	Jackson	and	Victor	2015c);		
• Under	the	Balanced	Trade	scenario	several	of	these	undesirable	features	were	substantially	
improved:	the	balance	of	payments	problem	(not	surprisingly)	practically	disappeared,	the	
collapse	in	pensions	was	stabilised,	and	the	housing	bubble	and	overleveraging	of	the	
household	sector	was	greatly	reduced;	
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• Conversely,	these	gains	were	achieved	at	the	cost	of	considerably	lower	growth,	higher	
unemployment,	and	an	increased	debt	to	GDP	ratio;	
• The	Green	Transformation	scenario	was	the	only	scenario	which	delivered	a	substantial	
reduction	in	the	EBI	(Figure	9);	it	also	ultimately	reduced	unemployment	below	the	levels	in	
the	Base	Run;	but	these	gains	were	achieved	at	the	cost	of	rising	inflation	and	a	decline	in	
the	real	growth	rate	to	zero	by	the	end	of	the	run;	though	the	debt	to	GDP	ratio	was	also	
high	in	this	scenario,	the	real	debt	servicing	costs	declined	below	the	base	run	by	the	end	of	
the	scenario	as	a	result	of	higher	inflation;		
• The	flexibility	of	the	government	to	engage	in	countercyclical	spending	plays	an	important	
role	in	stabilising	the	decline	in	the	growth	rate;	attempts	to	impose	‘austerity’	when	real	
growth	declines	lead	to	potential	collapse	states.				
	
These	findings	are	subject	to	a	number	of	caveats	and	limitations,	not	the	least	of	which	is	the	beta	
status	of	the	underlying	model	and	the	particular	assumptions	made	about	behaviour	within	
different	financial	sectors.		For	instance,	there	is	no	‘realistic’	model	of	dynamic	market	responses,	
such	as	the	response	of	financial	markets	to	the	degree	of	leverage	of	the	household	sector.	
Consequently,	the	financial	and	political	fragility	of	each	scenario	can	only	really	be	assessed	by	
inspection	of	the	underlying	balance	sheets.	In	reality,	such	fragility	would	likely	create	financial	
instability	long	before	the	model	revealed	problems	in	the	macroeconomic	aggregates.					
	
Nonetheless,	the	work	reported	in	Jackson	and	Victor	2015c	has	several	important	merits.	First	of	
all,	it	highlights	the	importance	of	incorporating	financial	and	monetary	analysis	into	a	
macroeconomic	model	of	green	investment.		Secondly,	it	illustrates	the	feasibility	of	achieving	a	
stock-flow	consistent	description	of	the	macroeconomy,	with	a	consistent	set	of	transaction	flow	
matrices	and	financial	balances	across	each	sector	and	the	economy	as	a	whole.		Finally,	it	illustrates	
the	kinds	of	trade-offs	that	might	be	anticipated,	when	a	substantial	proportion	of	national	income	is	
redirected	towards	a	different	form	of	investment.		In	the	particular	circumstances	explored	here,	
FALSTAFFW	has	revealed	potentially	inflationary	effects	from	a	large-scale	transition	to	green	
investment	while	still	maintaining	full	employment.		
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Figure	9:	Illustrative	trends	in	‘Environmental	Burden	Index’	
1	=	Base	run;	2	=	Balanced	Trade;	3	=	Green	Transformation	
Source:	Jackson	and	Victor	2015c	(Fig	18)	
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7	 ECOGRO:	An	integrated	approach	to	growth,	inequality	and	the		
environment		
The	previous	sections	have	described	three	separate	applications	of	SFC	modelling	carried	out	at	the	
University	of	Surrey	in	collaboration	with	York	University	in	Canada.	A	parallel	development,	broadly	
using	the	same	post-Keynesian	SFC	framework,	was	carried	out	at	the	University	of	Vienna.	The	
ECOGRO	model	is	a	multi-sector	macro	model	in	a	stock-flow	consistent	(SFC)	demand	driven	
framework.		There	are	a	number	of	differences	between	the	ECOGRO	model	and	the	SIGMA	and	
FALSTAFF	models	developed	in	Surrey.		
In	the	first	place,	SIGMA	and	FALSTAFF	are	both	calibrated	at	the	level	of	the	national	economy;	
ECOGRO	is	calibrated	for	the	EU	as	a	whole.	Secondly,	ECOGRO	separates	out	the	energy	sector	from	
within	the	firms	sector	in	order	to	explore	the	implications	of	changing	the	energy	mix.	Thirdly,	
ECOGRO	explores	the	impact	of	including	an	environmental	damage	function	on	the	output	of	the	
economy.	Finally,	the	financial	structure	of	ECOGRO	is	somewhat	simplified	by	comparison	with	
SIGMA	and	FALSTAFF	with	a	slightly	less	complex	balance	sheet	and	fewer	specific	representations	
of	financial	behaviour.32		
Figure	10	below	summarises	the	overall	structure	of	the	ECOGRO	model	which	consists	of	a	five-
sector	real	economy	comprising	households,	firms,	banks,	central	bank	and	government	and	an	
additional	‘environment’	sector	which	provides	resource	inputs	and	receives	environmental	
emissions.	This	innovation	allows	ECOGRO	to	integrate	supply	side	environmental	constraints	
(Kroenenberg	2010;	Fontana	and	Sawyer	2013)	to	deal	with	production	led	emissions	in	the	EU.	
The	firms	sector	in	ECOGRO	is	taken	as	a	macro	institution	that	produces	both	capital	and	
consumption	goods	demanded	within	the	economy.	The	production	process	requires	three	key	
inputs	–	labor,	capital	and	energy.	While	labor	is	provided	by	households	and	capital	stock	formation	
is	supported	through	loans	from	banks,	energy	is	produced	by	the	sector	itself.	Total	energy	supply	is	
determined	by	total	expected	output	which	is	given	as	a	mix	of	non-renewable	and	renewable	
energy.	This	creates	a	vertical	linkage	across	two	producer	types	within	a	sector	creating	a	supply-
chain	that	allows	for	inter-sectoral	feed	backs	through	demand	and	price	changes.	
As	indicated	above,	the	household	sector	is	divided	between	capitalists	(who	in	ECOGRO	are	the	sole	
owners	of	both	production	sector	and	banks)	and	workers	(who	supply	labour	to	firms	and	earn	
wages	from	them).		The	household	sector	as	a	whole	earns	income	either	through	firms’	profits	or	
through	wages.	Household	income	is	used	for	consumption	which	in	turn	generates	demand	and	
																																								 																				
32		 The	work	in	this	section	is	described	in	more	detail	in	a	WWWforEurope	working	paper	available	online:	
http://www.foreurope.eu/fileadmin/documents/pdf/PolicyPapers/WWWforEurope_Policy_Paper_018.
pdf.			
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subsequently	production	decisions.	This	in	turn	determines	employment	levels	of	worker	
households.		
The	banking	sector	in	ECOGRO	is	modeled	as	simple	intermediary	between	the	households	and	the	
firm	sector.	Banks	hold	household	deposits	and	give	out	loans	to	firms.	If	deposits	are	insufficient	to	
meet	loan	demand,	the	banks	can	take	cash	advances	from	the	central	bank.	Profits	earned	by	the	
banks	are	redistributed	directly	to	capitalist	households.	
The	government	plays	the	role	of	maintaining	public	investment	and	supporting	unemployed.	In	
order	to	finance	this	expenditure,	the	government	raises	revenue	through	taxes	on	both	the	firms	
and	the	households.	If	expenditures	exceed	revenues,	the	government	issues	bonds	which	are	
purchased	by	the	central	bank.33	
	
Figure	10:	Overall	structure	of	the	ECOGRO	model	
Central	Bank:	The	central	bank	functions	as	the	financial	arm	of	the	government	where	it	controls	
money	supply	and	buys	and	sells	government	bonds	as	required.	Like	the	Banks	sector,	the	Central	
Bank	is	model	as	a	passive	agent	which	allows	for	monetary	transfers	between	the	private	and	the	
public	sectors	of	the	economy.	
																																								 																				
33		 This	structural	simplification	is	in	fact	prevented	by	the	Maastricht	Treaty	which	allows	central	banks	
only	to	hold	bonds	purchased	on	the	secondary	market.		But	for	the	purposes	of	the	scenario	
exploration	in	ECOGRO	this	is	not	decisive.		
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These	five	sectors	interact	with	each	other	to	form	the	real	side	of	the	ECOGRO	economy	in	a	closed	
demand-driven	framework.	Table	3	shows	the	balance	sheet	of	the	economy	in	terms	of	assets	and	
liabilities	and	subsequently	the	net	worth	of	the	economy.	
		 Households	 Production	 Financial	
Govt.	 ∑			 Workers	 Capitalists	 Firms	 Energy	 Banks	 Central	Bank	
Capital	
stock	
	 	
	+	K	 	+	KX		
	 	 	
	+	K	
Inventories	 	 	 	+	IN	 	+	INX	 	 	 	 	+	INV	
Bank	
Deposits	 	+	D
h	 	+	Dk	 	 	 	−	Db	 	 	 0	
Advances	 	 	 	 	 	+	Ab	 	−	A	 	 0	
Bills	 	 	 	 	 	 	+	BCB	 	−	B	 0	
Loans	
	 	
	−	Lf	 	−	LX		 	+	L	
	 	
0	
∑	 	+	Vh	 	+	Vk	 	+	Vf	 	+	VX	 0	 0	 	−	VG	 	+	NV	
Table	3:	Ecogro	Balance	Sheet		
Households’	net	worth	is	defined	in	terms	of	deposits	while	firms	value	is	determined	by	capital	
stock	and	inventories	minus	loans.	The	government	sector	is	assumed	to	have	a	negative	net	worth,	
while	the	banking	sector	and	the	central	bank	have	a	net	worth	of	zero	with	perfectly	balanced	
assets	and	liabilities.	
To	integrate	the	real	economy	with	physical	material	flows,	a	sixth	agent,	the	environment,	is	added	
to	the	model.	The	environment	is	modeled	as	an	independent	sector	that	interacts	with	the	
economy	through	two	different	channels.	First,	it	provides	a	non-renewable	raw	material	for	energy	
production.	Second,	it	accumulates	Greenhouse	Gasses	(GHGs)	through	the	production	process.	This	
interaction	between	the	real	and	the	environmental	sector	allows	for	studying	issues	of	growth,	
distributions	and	climate	change	in	a	well-integrated	single	economic	framework.	For	example,	
higher	consumption	levels	result	in	a	higher	use	of	resources	for	output	production.	This	in	turn	
increases	both	demand	for	labor	and	energy	which	can	have	secondary	multiplier	impacts	on	the	
economy.	Without	fully	understanding	how	these	changes	feedback	and	stabilize	across	the	whole	
economic	system,	it	is	hard	to	justify	the	role	of	economic	policy	in	the	long-run.	Another	advantage	
of	this	framework	lies	in	addressing	the	distributional	impact	of	different	polices	especially	on	inter-
household	income	and	consumption	distributions.	While	certain	policies	might	not	result	in	a	change	
in	aggregate	demand,	they	might	have	a	non-trivial	impact	the	worker	and	capitalist	income	and	
consumption	distributions.		
Five	policy	scenarios	have	been	evaluated	so	far	in	ECOGRO	(Naqvi	2015);		
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§ LowCons:	Reduction	in	consumption	levels	to	reduce	emission	levels	following	the	„limits-
to-growth“	hypothesis	(Jackson	2009).		
§ DmgFunc:	Damage	to	capital	stock	is	proportional	to	the	level	of	emissions	and	thus	requires	
higher	investment	levels	to	maintain	production	capacity	(Nordhaus	2011,	Rezai	and	Taylor	
2012,	Taylor	and	Foley	2014).	Capital	stock	depreciation	rate	is	endogenized	to	the	level	of	
emissions.	
§ HiRenew:	High	share	of	more	expensive	renewable	energy	in	the	economy	to	reduce	
emissions	(Tahvonen	and	Salo	2001).	Renewable	energy	is	assumed	to	be	more	capital	
intensive	and	more	expensive	than	non-renewable	energy.	Thus	in	order	to	shift	to	a	higher	
renewable	energy	sector,	significant	investment	decisions	need	to	be	made	to	allow	for	a	
low	carbon	transition.	This	experiment	looks	at	the	indirect	consequences	of	this	transition	
process.	
§ Carbon	taxes	(TaxF,	TaxH):	Firms	and	households	pay	carbon	taxes	which	are	endogenously	
related	to	the	level	of	emissions	(Marron	and	Toder	2014).	A	carbon	tax	is	usually	proposed	
as	an	instrument	to	curb	emissions.	The	debate	is	divided	on	whether	it	should	be	on	firms	
(creator	of	jobs)	or	households	(consumers	of	output).	This	experiment	looks	at	the	
implications	of	both	taxes	across	the	economy.	
§ Technological	innovation;	(InnoK,	InnoE):	On	the	one	hand,	technological	innovation	has	
resulted	in	relative	decoupling	across	high	income	countries	(Jackson	2009).	On	the	other	
hand,	innovation	implies	low	production	costs,	which	can	result	in	higher	consumption	
levels.	In	order	to	assess	the	impact	of	this	“rebound	effect”,	the	model	looks	at	two	
exogenous	technological	parameters;	technological	improvement	in	capital	required	per	unit	
of	output	and	energy	required	per	unit	of	output	(Herring	and	Roy	2007).		
A	number	of	model	output	variables	are	measured	against	a	Business-as-Usual	(BAU)	benchmark	
across	the	seven	scenarios	defined	above.	These	variables	include:	real	output;		unemployment;	
inequality	(ratio	of	capitalist	to	worker	incomes);	and	environmental	sustainability	(greenhouse	gas	
emissions)	and	compared	with	a	Business-as-Usual	(BAU)	benchmark	scenario.	Figures	11-14	show	
the	simulation	results	for	these	four	key	indicators.	
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Figure	11:	Real	output	relative	to	BAU	Scenario	
	
	
Figure	12:	Unemployment	in	ECOGRO	relative	to	BAU	scenario	
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Figure	13:	GHG	emissions	in	ECOGRO	relative	to	BAU	scenario		
	 	
	
Figure	14:	Income	inequality	in	ECOGRO	relative	to	BAU	scenario	
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The	results	show	that	neither	the	link	between	output	and	income	distribution,	nor	the	link	between	
output	and	the	environment	is	predetermined.	In	particular,	while	the	connection	between	output	
and	unemployment	conforms	to	the	standard	formulation	of	Okun’s	law,	the	income	level	and	the	
functional	income	distribution	are	not	as	clear-cut.	Similar	macro	level	outcomes	can	be	the	result	of	
very	different	underlying	structural	and	distributional	changes.	Regarding	environmental	aspects,	
the	absolute	decoupling	of	energy	use	and	emissions	from	output	can	be	observed	in	this	model	in	
some	cases.	
Four	policies	show	different	trade-offs	between	growth,	inequality	and	environment.	The	de-growth	
(LowCons)	simulation	shows	that	the	lower	output	leads	to	higher	unemployment	while	at	the	same	
time	reducing	inequality	in	the	functional	income	distribution.34	If	emissions	feed	back	into	the	
depreciation	of	the	capital	stock	as	in	the	damage	function	experiment	(DmgFunc),	this	has	the	
opposite	effect:	unemployment	falls	but	the	functional	income	distribution	worsens	for	workers.	At	
the	same	time,	this	is	the	only	policy	which	leads	to	higher	emissions	due	to	increased	investment	
requirements.	Environmental	taxes	on	households	(TaxH)	or	firms	(TaxF)	have	mainly	distributive	
effects	while	leaving	output	and	emissions	largely	unchanged.	
Three	policies,	however,	appear	to	offer	triple-win	characteristics.	Increasing	the	share	of	renewable	
energy	(HiRenew)	reduces	emissions	while	leaving	all	other	outcome	variables	virtually	unchanged.	
Finally,	innovations	in	capital	(InnoK)	or	in	energy	(InnoE)	productivity	reduce	both	energy	use	and	
emissions,	while	at	the	same	time	raising	real	incomes	and	redistributing	towards	workers.	
The	model	presented	here	can	be	extended	to	test	for	additional	climate-related	policies	while	
keeping	track	of	the	feedback	effects.	These,	for	example,	can	include	consumption	based	emissions	
through	imports,	endogenous	growth,	endogenous	technical	change,	endogenous	pro-	(austerity)	or	
counter-cyclical	(stimulus)	government	spending.	Other	key	areas	include	the	inclusion	of	aspects	of	
financialisation	that	indirectly	feedback	into	the	real	economy	and	subsequently	impact	the	
environment.	
	
	 	
																																								 																				
34		 It	should	be	noted	that,	in	contrast	to	scenarios	in	Sections	4-6,	no	variations	in	labour	productivity	
growth	or	working	hours	are	explored	in	this	section.		Hence	the	relationship	between	output	and	
employment	is	clearly	coupled.			
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8		 Discussion	and	Conclusions	
Modern	western	economies	(in	the	Eurozone	and	elsewhere)	face	a	number	of	challenges	over	the	
coming	decades.		Achieving	full	employment,	meeting	climate	change	and	other	environmental	
targets	and	reducing	inequality	rank	amongst	the	highest	of	these.		The	conventional	route	to	
achieving	full	employment	and	reducing	inequality	has	been	to	pursue	economic	growth.	But	this	
route	has	created	two	critical	problems	for	modern	economies.	The	first	of	these	is	the	coupling	
between	output	and	environmental	impact.	The	second	is	the	fragility	in	financial	balances	that	has	
accompanied	relentless	demand	expansion.		
The	prevailing	global	response	to	the	coupling	between	output	and	emissions	has	been	to	encourage	
decoupling	through	investing	in	green	technologies	(green	growth).		But	this	response	runs	the	risk	
of	exacerbating	problems	associated	with	the	over-leveraging	of	households,	firms	and	
governments.	An	alternative	approach	is	to	reduce	the	pace	of	growth	and	to	restructure	economies	
around	green	services	(post-growth).35	But	the	potential	dangers	of	declining	growth	rates	lie	in	
increased	inequality	and	in	rising	unemployment.	Some	more	fundamental	arguments	have	also	
been	made	against	the	feasibility	of	interest-bearing	debt	within	a	post-growth	economy.			
The	analyses	in	this	paper	have	been	motivated	by	the	need	to	address	these	fundamental	dilemmas	
and	to	inform	the	debate	that	has	emerged	in	recent	years	about	the	relative	merits	of	green	growth	
and	post-growth	scenarios.		In	pursuit	of	this	aim	we	have	developed	a	suite	of	macroeconomic	
models	based	on	the	methodology	of	Post-Keynesian	Stock	Flow	Consistent	(SFC)	system	dynamics.		
Aggregate	demand	was	calibrated	at	the	level	of	the	national	economy	(UK,	Canada)	in	three	of	the	
models	and	at	the	level	of	the	EU	as	a	whole	in	the	fourth.		Applications	of	the	modelling	framework	
have	included:	
• Explorations	of	income	inequality	(SIGMA,	ECOGRO)		
• Understandings	of	the	‘growth	imperative’	(FALSTAFFS)	
• Assessments	of	employment	and	unemployment	(SIGMA,	FALSTAFFW,	ECOGRO)	
• Examinations	of	the	effect	of	trade	balances	and	imbalances	(FALSTAFFW)	
• Elaboration	of	financial	balances	and	imbalances	(FALSTAFFS,	FALSTAFFW)		
• Illustration	of	green	investment	scenarios	(FALSTAFFW,	ECOGRO)	
• Exploration	of	trade-offs	between	policy	goals	(FALSTAFFW,	ECOGRO)	
Our	conclusions	at	this	stage	are	necessarily	preliminary,	but	it	is	possible	to	identify	a	number	of	
important	findings.	We	group	these	findings	into	several	‘blocks’	relating	to	the	key	challenges	
defined	above:	
																																								 																				
35		 It	is	worth	pointing	out	that	western	economies	may	find	themselves	confronted	with	declining	
growth	rates	perforce,	irrespective	of	other	goals,	as	a	result	of	‘secular	stagnation’.	
	
	
	
48	|	P a g e 	
	
	 	
	
The	role	of	green	investment	
• substantial	green	investment	is	vital	to	both	a	green	growth	and	a	post-growth	world;	
• finding	ways	to	finance	green	investment	without	destabilizing	financial	balance	sheets	or	
over-leveraging	specific	sectors	is	critical;	
• a	key	(unresolved)	question	in	the	debate	is	the	extent	to	which	green	investment	does	or	
does	not	contribute	to	the	productive	capacity	of	the	economy	as	conventionally	measured;		
• depending	on	the	answer	to	this	question,	substantial	green	investment	faces	potential	
complexities	in	terms	of	sector	imbalances,	balance	sheet	fragility	and	inflationary	prices;	
• macroeconomic	policy	that	fails	to	incorporate	such	understandings	is	not	capable	of	fully	
addressing	the	financial	feasibility	of	green	investment.	
	
Addressing	inequality		
• rising	inequality	is	a	potential	danger	in	both	a	post-growth	and	a	green	growth	world;	but	
combatting	inequality	is	entirely	possible	within	both	strategies;	
• key	elements	in	the	fight	against	inequality	include:		
o increasing	capital	and	energy	productivity	and	slowing	down	the	substitution	of	
capital	for	labour;		
o protecting	the	rights	of	wage	labour	against	excessive	profit	maximization	by	the	
owners	of	capital;	
o engaging	in	progressive	taxation	of	income	and	introducing	a	low	level	of		taxation	
on	capital;	
o introducing	mechanisms	for	redistributing	the	ownership	of	capital	and	slowing	
down	asymmetric	accumulation	in	capital	assets.			
	
Maintaining	full	employment		
• productivity-driven	growth	creates	an	inherent	challenge	to	full	employment;	
• the	challenge	of	full	employment	in	a	post-growth	economy	arises	primarily	from	the	pursuit	
of	labour	productivity	growth;	
• achieving	full	employment	with	declining	growth	rates	can	be	achieved	through	two	
strategies:		
o reducing	the	hours	worked	per	employee	
o reducing	the	rate	of	growth	of	labour	productivity	in	the	economy	
• expansion	of	service-based	economic	activities	represents	a	double	dividend	in	terms	of	
reducing	environmental	burdens	and	increasing	employment	(Figure	15).	
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Figure	15:	Direct	and	Indirect	Employment	and	GHG	Emissions	per	$m	in	2010	in	Canada	
Source:	Jackson	et	al	2014	(Figure	2)36	
	
Achieving	financial	stability		
• growth	is	not	essential	for	the	achievement	of	financial	stability;	but	debt-fueled	growth	can	
lead	to	financial	instability;	
• austerity	policy	presents	a	significant	risk	of	economic	instability;	
• countercyclical	spending	is	a	key	element	in	the	maintenance	of	financial	stability;	
• balanced	trade	policy	can	reduce	financial	imbalances	and	(in	some	circumstances)	tame	the	
creation	of	asset	price	bubbles.		
	
Considerable	uncertainties	still	attend	the	precise	evolution	of	a	convincing	strategy	for	either	green	
growth	or	for	a	post-growth	economy.		But	the	principal	elements	of	any	strategy	for	meeting	the	
challenges	which	have	motivated	this	work	are	already	clear	and	must	include:	a	robust	strategy	for	
green	investment,	employment	policy	that	is	not	simply	contingent	on	high-growth,	distributive	
policies	to	address	severe	disparities	in	income	and	wealth,	and	rigorous	institutional	requirements	
																																								 																				
36		 The	results	shown	in	Figure	15	are	taken	from	an	expanded	version	of	the	FALSTAFF	framework	
which	will	eventually	include	a	multi-sector	input	output	structure	and	is	part	of	the	ongoing	
development	of	the	Surrey/York	led	work.					
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for	financial	stability.	A	particularly	premium	lies	in	strategies	that	offer	multiple	benefits	or	
dividends	in	terms	of	the	over-arching	challenges	articulated	above.		
So,	for	example,	a	structural	shift	towards	service-based	activities	(Figure	15)	has	the	potential	to	
help	meet	carbon	targets	and	at	the	same	time	to	improve	employment	outcomes.		Investment	in	
energy	productivity	can	reduce	environmental	impacts,	improve	trade	balances	and	may	in	some	
circumstances	contribute	to	redistribution	towards	wage	labour	(Figure	14).		Countercyclical	
spending	strategies	by	government	can	reduce	financial	instability	and	help	maintain	full	
employment.				
Finally,	it	is	to	be	noted	that	supposedly	‘fundamental’	objections	to	the	feasibility	of	a	post-growth	
economy	are	not	supported	by	this	research.	There	are	in	principle	ways	to	achieve	full	employment,	
meet	environmental	targets,	reduce	income	inequality	and	maintain	financial	stability	even	in	the	
absence	of	exponential	rates	of	growth.	Encouragingly,	our	research	also	suggests	that	such	a	
transition	can	be	achieved	without	entirely	dismantling	the	existing	financial	architecture	of	interest-
bearing	debt.	Nonetheless,	there	are	some	significant	advantages	associated	with	financial	and	
monetary	reform	–	including	the	potential	for	sovereign	money	creation.	Not	the	least	of	these	
advantages	is	the	potential	for	post-growth	governments	to	reduce	the	cost	of	social	investment	and	
engage	more	easily	in	countercyclical	spending.						
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